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Executive
Summary

T

THIS REPORT FOCUSES ON TAX POLICY

and economic development in Maine.
Separate reports have been prepared as part
of a broader project that includes examination of economic development trends and
workforce development issues. The purpose
of this report is to provide a foundation for
discussion and debate of tax policy options
generally and, in particular, those relating to
economic development in Maine. The work
in this report begins with a brief discussion
of the linkages between tax policy and economic development. The discussion then
turns to the criteria used to structure tax policy (known as the requirements of a good tax
system), state and local revenue trends, and
specific state and local taxes. Extensive references to the research literature are offered to
enable the reader to probe more deeply into
specific areas of policy interest. This report
is simply the tip of the iceberg.
Several general conclusions emerge from
this report:
1. Tax policy and economic development
need to be considered in the broader
context of state-provided services and
state aid, and the structure of local government finances and service delivery.
The fiscal system of Maine is not transparent to most taxpayers; finances are
heavily centralized at the state level;
state aid (particularly aid to education)
limits the flexibility of state government
and there is essentially no local government tax autonomy. These problems

are interwoven and cannot be easily
addressed in isolation.
2. Public policy should be based on wellestablished goals for the tax system and
economic development. Tax policy goals
should recognize the accepted tenets of
a good tax system, including tax fairness;
revenue yield, stability and elasticity;
neutrality and economic development;
and low costs of administration and compliance. In practice these goals can be in
conflict with one another, giving rise to
difficult choices for policymakers.
Similarly, economic development policies—including economic development
incentives—must be based on specific
goals and must be amenable to evaluation
to gauge effectiveness.
3. The state should sustain a relatively
strong degree of overall tax system elasticity to allow for maintenance of a strong
rainy day fund and to enable investments
that are not possible during periods of
weak revenue growth.
4. Efforts to promote tax fairness should rely
on the personal income tax, not the sales,
corporate income or property taxes. The
personal income tax allows policy to
focus on the specific circumstances of
households, unlike other taxes.
5. Greater revenue balance, such as diversity in revenue sources, is needed at both
the state and local levels. The state relies
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too heavily on the personal income tax,
while local governments have no viable
alternative to the property tax.
More specific recommendations include:
1. Maine’s personal income tax rate structure should be compressed, potentially
moving to a single flat rate. The current
structure includes a rapidly progressive
rate structure that can distort economic
activity. The rate structure of the personal income tax should mirror that of the
corporate income tax.
2. There appears to be some room to
increase selective sales taxes, meaning
the unique rates levied on specific items
such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco.
While these items tend to grow slowly
with economy-wide growth, they can still
be an important complement to the overall state tax base. Concerns over the
regressivity of such levies should be
addressed through the income tax.
3. Maine has largely mirrored the nation
with its corporate income tax, adopting a
double-weighted sales factor for corporate
income apportionment and enabling limited liability entities. But the evidence
suggests corporate tax burdens in Maine
have not fallen to the same extent as the
pattern for New England and the nation.
Further analysis of this issue is clearly
warranted, given the importance of the
corporate income tax to economic development. There is no clear understanding
today of Maine’s corporate tax burden relative to other states, particularly as it pertains to tax burdens for specific sectors of
the economy and for firms of different
sizes. Consideration should be given to
elimination of the progressive corporate
rate structure, moving to a flat rate com-
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mensurate with the suggested flat rate on
personal income. Consideration should
also be given to a business enterprise tax,
akin to that in New Hampshire, as a
replacement for the corporate income
tax. Such a policy would expand the business tax burden to all firms, allow for low
rates of taxation and provide a more stable flow of revenue.
4. Efforts should be made to move the sales
tax closer to a true consumption tax. To
the extent possible, business sales tax burdens should be reduced, as the sales tax
borne by business exceeds the burden of
the corporate income tax. Consumer services should be added to the base of the
sales tax to the extent possible.
5. Grocery food should be added to the sales
tax base, enhancing revenue yield and
stability, increasing tax exporting opportunities, and simplifying administration
and compliance. Relief can be provided at
a substantially lower cost through the personal income tax, including refundable
credits for low-income households.
6. The state should avoid pressures to
reduce the elasticity of the sales tax, especially through tax rate reductions.
External forces are at play that are working to lower the performance of the sales
tax, including the continued growth in
mail order sales, electronic commerce
and the service sector.
7. The system of local government finance
is broken. The historical benefit-property
tax linkage no longer exists. The presence
of the Business Equipment Tax
Reimbursement (BETR) program, Tax
Increment Financing (TIF) districts, circuit breakers and homestead exemptions
under the property tax, coupled with no
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other local tax instruments of note, compromises local government’s ability to
provide services and its responsibility
to be accountable for the same.
Consideration should be given to wiping
the slate clean and simply lowering property taxes from their current levels in a
revenue-neutral fashion. These issues
must be addressed prior to the enabling of
additional local taxing authority.
8. Specific options for expanded local taxing
authority should be developed. Local
options sales taxes and gross receipts taxes
are particularly attractive options for consideration. Regional tax base sharing, or
state aid, should be used to help equalize
tax capacity across municipalities.
These are some of the more important recommendations that follow from the review
of economic development and tax structure
in Maine. The full report provides background and a more complete discussion of
the issues.
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7

PA R T

O N E

Introduction

L

LIKE

REGIONAL ECONOMIES ACROSS
the world, the Maine economy continues to
undergo rapid transformation and change.
These changes offer the state and its residents new opportunities as well as new
challenges. The decline of traditional industries is encouraging entrepreneurs to look
in new directions. The emergence of the
World Wide Web enables immediate access
to the global economy and new business
opportunities. The work ethic of the labor
force and quality of life should support new
business and industry, and help to retain
people and families. But change also creates
threats and challenges.

In Maine’s case traditional historical economic advantages—including shipbuilding,
national defense and forestry and fisheries—
are not being fully supplanted by new competitive alternatives. Complicating Maine’s
economic development situation is its location and relative isolation, which can raise
the costs of doing business in the state vis-avis other locations. Earnings growth has stagnated. Regional differences within the state
are seemingly more pronounced than ever,
raising concerns about two (or more)
Maines.1 The population is aging and anecdotes suggest a brain drain of young workers.
Sprawl is increasing, raising service delivery
costs for state and local governments alike,
aggravating a pre-existing service-center cost
problem. Furthermore, in 1998, Maine found

1

itself leading the nation in combined state
and local tax burden, leading to increased
pressures for tax reform generally and tax
relief targeted to specific taxpayer groups.
Residents of Maine find themselves asking:
What went wrong? Some would like to blame
taxes, others might point to location, still others would argue that global competition is
the culprit. The reality is that there is no single reason for the dramatic changes taking
place in the Maine economy, and hence
there is no single nor simple solution.
The outlook hasn’t always been as bleak as
the picture painted above suggests. The
1980s brought a welcomed economic boom
to the state that benefited many families,
…in 1998, Maine
businesses and refound itself leading
gions. This is the
the nation in comMaine folks would like
bined state and local
to remember. But this
tax burden,…
same boom may have
What went wrong?
simply masked serious underlying structural defects in the economy and tax structure. The economic collapse in the early
1990s brought these weaknesses to the forefront. The 1990s were a period of introspection and debate on the subjects of economic
development and tax policy. The recent
recession offers yet another important challenge to the economy and state and local government finances. Today, residents of Maine

In September 1998, the Bangor Daily News ran a multi-part series on “The Two Maines: Separate but not Equal.” Many learned residents
have discussed different dimensions of the haves-have nots problem of the state.
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are building on the experiences of the past
twenty years, working earnestly to construct
economic development and tax policies that
can address and respond to changing economic and demographic conditions.
This report is about taxes and economic
development in the state of Maine. It is one
of three reports being published by the
Margaret Chase Smith Center for Public
Policy at the University of Maine, each of
which are funded jointly by the U.S.
Economic Development Administration and
the University of Maine. Other work will
focus more specifically on economic development trends and issues, as well as issues
related to the labor force and workforce
development. It is hoped that the three
reports will offer a complementary view of
the economic development issues and
options confronting the state of Maine today.
This report on taxes builds heavily on the
hard work and good thinking of residents of
Maine who have first-hand experience with
the subject. Data and background sources of
information on important policy issues are
presented and discussed. The goal is to provide a common foundation for discussion
and debate on the tax policy-economic development conundrum in Maine. Many of the
ideas in this report are not at all original,
having been drawn from the insights and
experiences of others.

finances in Maine, based on comparable
interstate data. This helps to place Maine in
both a regional and a national context. The
fifth section is an analysis of major state
taxes, and key local tax issues, built around
the previously introduced tax policy criteria.
Any tax policy proposals must be built on a
thorough understanding of the way in which
taxes are structured in practice, and their
strengths and weaknesses. The report closes
with a discussion of tax policy and economic
development, including considerations for
policy change.

The report is organized as follows: The next
section provides a general discussion of quality of life, tax policy and economic development in Maine to illustrate the way in which
these issues are connected. The third section
of the report introduces well-established tax
policy criteria—known as the requirements
of a good tax system—that are used to help
guide the analysis of tax systems and tax
reform. The fourth section provides an
overview of state and local government

10
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PA R T

T W O

Taxes and
Economic Development

Q

Maine are friendly and hardworking, and
there is a deep commitment to fostering further improvements in quality of life. A look
at the data says a lot about the commitment
of Maine residents toward their neighbors
and their future. Table 1 shows national
rankings for selected components of the socalled Camelot Index, which—as the name

QUALITY

OF LIFE AND A STRONG
business climate are essential to any state.
While it is easy to discuss the economic and
fiscal woes confronting Maine, it is equally
easy to discuss the many strengths of the
state and its residents. The natural beauty of
Maine is unrivaled, offering a high quality of
life for those who want it. The people of

Table 1: National Ranking for Selected Camelot Index Components
New England States

Healthy people
Crime free
Educated population
Healthy society
Prudent government

ME

CT

MA

NH

RI

VT

12
5
12
12
42

8
14
15
23
47

2
22
16
26
38

5
1
17
13
30

6
14
20
44
49

13
4
7
14
45

Source: State Policy Reports 19(7): 2001.

Table 2: National Ranking for Selected Kids Count 2002 Indicators
New England States

ME

CT

MA

NH

RI

VT

Percent low birth
weight babies

6

23

18

9

20

2

Infant mortality rate

1

12

4

9

6

9

Child death rate

6

3

2

3

7

7

Teen death rate*

32

5

3

6

2

15

4

10

5

1

16

2

12

8

6

2

16

9

Teen birth rate
National composite rank

Note: * Rate of teen death by accident, suicide or homicide; all data are for the time period 1999.
Source: www.aecf.org/kidscount/kc2002/index.htm
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implies—is intended to speak to the quality
of life within and across states. By most
measures the state compares well with its
peers in the northeast and other states
across the nation. Maine ranks twelfth in
the nation in terms of a healthy society, a
measure which captures an array of items
including homeownership, voting participation rates, the number of unwed mothers,
the number of single-parent families and the
percent of the population receiving welfare.
All states in New England rank poorly in
terms of prudent government, largely
reflecting high tax burdens that prevail
across the region. The nationally recognized
Kids Count program also ranks Maine relatively highly by U.S. and regional standards,
as shown in Table 2.

business prosperity than on broad measures
of quality of life. As such, it perhaps is no
surprise that Maine does not rate as highly
by these measures. A case in point is the
annual Development Report Card for the
States, prepared by the Corporation for
Enterprise Development. Shown in Table 3
are the rankings for Maine and other New
England states for 2001. Maine’s best grade
is in the performance category, where it
receives a B, reflecting good measures of
equity and quality of life. But the state
received poor rankings on job quality (i.e.,
earnings) and short-term employment
growth. In business vitality the state
receives only a C, reflecting the dual weaknesses of low competitiveness and entrepreneurship. Finally is the development capacity category, where Maine earned a D. The
reason for this low grade is that the state
generally ranks low on human, financial,
infrastructure and amenity resources, as
well as innovation assets. The reader is
strongly encouraged to visit the Web site
that serves as the source for this information
and study it carefully to identify both fact
and fiction.

Clearly there is something terribly right
about the state of Maine. Maine residents are
making some good choices that have borne
fruit, but some of these choices have come at
a price, namely relatively high taxes at the
state and local level. Like most things in life,
you get what you pay for, and taxes are no
exception. A question that Maine will
increasingly find itself asking is whether this
is a price that residents can afford to pay.

It is relatively easy to find similar, if not
more negative rankings for Maine and the
state economy. For example, the Small
Business Survival Committee released its

Business climate indexes, as the very name
implies, focus more on factors related to

Table 3: Report Card Ranking of New England States, 2001
New England States

ME

CT

MA

NH

RI

VT

Performance

B

A

A

A

B

A

Business vitality

C

A

A

C

C

B

Development capacity

D

A

A

C

C

C

Source: Development Report Card for the States, 2001. Corporation for Enterprise Development,
www.cfed.org.
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seventh annual Small Business Survival
Index in July 2002.2 This group, which is
particulary interested in the role of government policies on entrepreneurship and
small businesses, placed Maine third from
the bottom across all states; only Hawaii and
the District of Columbia had lower rankings.
Given the strong role that taxes play in this
index, it is no surprise that Maine finds itself
so poorly ranked.
A final perspective is offered by the Milken
Institute, which has developed a New
Economy Index.3 The purpose of the index
is to capture a state’s preparedness for economic growth in the so-called new economy
of information, knowledge and globalization.
In 2001 Maine received a national rank of
forty-three (a drop from thirty-five in 2000),
ranking far worse than any other state in
New England; Massachusetts received the
top ranking. The relevance of this index
reflects the criteria used in its construction,
which range from measures of educational
attainment to research and develop spending to business startups. The data suggest
Maine is ill-prepared to integrate itself into
the new economy. Again the reader is
encouraged to study the index in greater
detail to better understand the reasons for
the state’s ranking.
All of the data used in this discussion are
intended to provoke thought, discussion and
debate. Certainly no single index can adequately capture all dimensions of quality of
life or business climate. But there are some
important common themes to the data and
the perceptions they reflect and help to
form. Maine does support a high quality of

life and residents are committed to their
future. At the same time, the Maine economy is struggling; there are problems with
the existing workforce and the workforce of
the future; and there are imbalances in the
state’s tax system. To some extent, the economic development and tax problems are
interwoven. The economy does influence
revenue
performance, just as the tax
…why do many states
system
influences
and nations with high
economic
activity.
taxes prosper, and
Similarly,
today’s
why do numerous lowworkforce influences
tax states and nations
the productivity of
struggle to engineer
the economy and
economic prosperity?
determines the foundation for the economy of the future. Taxes influence how much
one works, where people choose to live and
the educational investments people make.

Taxes
Taxes in Maine rank among the highest in
the nation and some argue that they are the
major obstacles to stronger economic
growth.4 But if high taxes were the sole culprit, why do many states and nations with
high taxes prosper, and why do numerous
low-tax states and nations struggle to engineer economic prosperity? Taxes and economic development is a two-way street.
Taxes do influence economic activity, just as
economic performance influences revenue
performance. Certainly taxes matter; the real
question is: How much? Timothy Bartik of
the W.E. UpJohn Institute for Employment
Research released his summary of the

2

See www.sbsc.org.

3

See www.milkeninstitute.org/ecoindex/index.html.

4

A nice introduction to the issue is “Tax Policy and Economic Development: A Roundtable Assessment,” Maine Policy Review, December
1996. Participants of the roundtable include Brian Mahany, Alan P. Brigham, Christopher St. John and Charles Colgan.
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research of the role of taxes in influencing
economic behavior in 1991, at the time representing the most comprehensive inventory of the available research.5 Perusal of this
work clearly shows that while taxes do matter, the responsiveness to variations in taxes
across states and localities is in most
instances quite modest. A more recent summary, based on a symposium sponsored by
How high can taxes
the Federal Reserve
be without creating
Bank
of
Boston,
excessive economic
reached a similar conclusion.6 Of course,
distortions? How
the further out-of-line
much equity can
a tax system is relaMaine residents
tive to other jurisdicafford to buy through
tions, the greater will
their tax system…?
be the distortions.
The research also
shows that certain government policies,
ranging from education to infrastructure,
can enhance growth. Yes, taxes matter, as do
quality government-provided services.
Taxes are not breaking the back of the
Maine economy, nor would tax reform and
reductions in tax burdens likely lead to an
economic renaissance in the state. But taxes
are part of the problem and are part of the
solution. Tax burdens are high, distorting
economic activity (i.e., changing taxpayer
behavior) and raising concerns over tax fairness. Fiscal flexibility at both the state and
local level has been constrained and com-

14

promised. Sprawl and the infamous service
center problem (i.e., communities with
high public service delivery costs relative to
the ability to raise revenue from ownsource taxes) are sharply raising the costs of
government finance.
At the same time these internal tax problems
have surfaced, the state confronts the need
to use scarce public funds to invest in its
future to promote and support economic
development, especially investments in productive infrastructure and the workforce.
The plot thickens when external economic
and tax influences are put on the stage. The
forces of globalization and competition are
creating a new environment for economic
activity. Old protected industries and workers may no longer be competitive, creating
ripples across regions within the state. State
and local tax structure confronts its own
external challenges. Capital has become
more and more footloose over time as firms
seek out low-cost sites for doing business,
while tax planning is placing the traditional
corporate franchise and excise taxes at risk.
The property tax, heavily relied upon in
Maine and other New England states, has
long been the most disliked tax of all. Sales
tax bases are being eroded through targeted
exemptions granted to business, and consumer and business purchases from remote
vendors. The personal income tax is subject
to the threat of mobile, high-income taxpayers who increasingly resist high and progressive rates of taxation.

5

See Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies? by Timothy Bartik, W.E. UpJohn Institute for Employment
Research, Kalamazoo, 1991.

6

See “The Effects of State and Local Public Policies on Economic Development: An Overview,” by Katherine L. Bradbury, Yolanda K.
Kodrzycki and Robert Tannenwald, in “The Effects of State and Local Policies on Economic Development, Proceedings of a Symposium,”
New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, March/April 1997.
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A Summary:
The Road Ahead
The state of Maine is at a critical juncture.
High state taxes have received national notoriety, high local property taxes are discouraging growth in municipalities and straining
service delivery. The economic transformation of the national economy continues to
run its course and threatens to leave Maine
behind. Decisions regarding tax structure
and economic development policies need to
be made soon to influence the state’s future.
Maine must decide what it wants from its tax
system by setting out specific goals and
objectives, some of which may be in conflict
with one another. These conflicts and tradeoffs must be addressed, debated and balanced. How high can taxes be without creating excessive economic distortions? How
much equity can Maine residents afford to
buy through their tax system, knowing that
taxes distort economic activity? How rapidly
should revenues grow during prolonged periods of economic expansion, and how stable
should taxes be over the ups and downs of
the business cycle? These and other questions should be addressed through a participatory process built on a rock-solid foundation of information and data.

returns? What policies can be designed to
promote investments in human capital and
meet the workforce needs of Maine industry?
Tax considerations should be of paramount
concern in developing goals and practical
policies to address these and other questions.
None of these questions will be easy to
answer. But Maine has the brain trust to do
the work, design and implement the policies, and enjoy the benefits. The choices
need to be made now.

Similarly, explicit goals and objectives for
economic development generally, and workforce development in particular, need to be
established. How aggressively should the
state pursue tourism as a means of economic
development? Do call centers, back-office
operations and the like offer an engine of
growth for the Maine economy? Should
Maine be promoted as a retirement state?
How should incentive programs best be
structured to minimize tax losses and at the
same time maximize economic development

Taxes and Economic Development
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T H R E E

A Framework for the
Analysis of Tax Structure

T

TAX REFORM IS AN ONGOING SUBJECT

of debate in Maine and the pressures for
change seem to be mounting. A survey
undertaken by the Maine Municipal
Association in 1996 found that over threequarters of those surveyed wanted a major
overhaul of the tax system, with eyes
focused heavily on the local property tax. A
similar survey conducted in early 2002
found that 70% of respondents wanted comprehensive tax reform. The pressures have
become so serious, especially with respect to
the property tax, that tax limitation movements have sprung to life.7
Numerous learned Maine policymakers and
analysts have written about and discussed
the various tax challenges confronting state
and local governments. In January 1991 the
Final Report of the Select Committee on
Comprehensive Tax Reform was released. The
committee’s charge was the analysis of specific tax policy questions, with no overarching framework to guide the work and no
direct linkage to economic development policy. Another report, A Preliminary Outlook on

Maine Tax Policy, was released in September
1995. This report, prepared by a group of
well-regarded analysts from outside the state,
provided a broad overview of Maine’s tax system and discussed widely accepted tax policy
goals. The report reached conclusions that
would generally be accepted by citizens and
policymakers alike.8

Requirements of a
Good Tax System
What is generally needed to enable meaningful tax reform is a common foundation of
information and agreed-upon goals for tax policy and economic development. There are
generally accepted criteria for analysis of tax
systems at any level of government, and these
have been used to some extent to guide discussions in Maine. These criteria, often referred
to as “the requirements of a good tax system,”
embody the diverse policy goals ascribed to
taxes. This section presents the requirements
of a good tax system as a backdrop to the discussion of specific taxes in Maine, and the

7

Josephine LaPlante’s “A Property Tax Cap for Maine? Roots of Voter Discontent and Likely Impacts,” Maine Policy Review, July 1996, places
the debate in context and draws out some of the consequences of an effective tax cap. Also see the Maine Municipal Association’s “Impact
of a Tax Cap on Municipalities in Maine,” August 1996. This report offers little discussion but presents data on the consequences of a property tax cap for Maine municipalities. In a separate paper, LaPlante discusses the cap on spendable personal income tax revenue. See
“Capping Maine’s Income Tax: Neglected Issues and Dimensions,” Maine Policy Review, October 1995.

8

Also see “Challenges for Maine’s Tax System,” by Anthony Neves, Choices, VII, January 23, 2001; “Overhauling Maine’s Tax System,” by
Paula Valente, Maine Policy Review, December 1996; “Taking Charge of Maine’s Fiscal Fortunes: Taxes are Only One Piece of the Puzzle,”
by Josephine LaPlante, Maine Policy Review, May/June 1997; “Whose Tax Burden and Whose Tax Fairness?” by Christopher St. John,
Maine Policy Review, May/June 1997; and “Critical Exegesis of Maine’s Tax Code,” by Peter Mills, Maine Policy Review, Fall 1997. A series
of commentaries, including those by Steven Rowe, Evan Richert, Christopher Lockwood and Rick Douglas, appear in the Fall 1997 issue of
Maine Policy Review.
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strengths and weaknesses of these same taxes.
There is an inherent chicken-egg problem in
this discussion. That is, it is difficult to discuss
the elements of a good tax system without
making explicit references to specific taxes. At
the same time, the reverse approach of discussing specific taxes before discussing the
goals of the tax system renders the analysis
unstructured and of incomplete value.
As discussed more fully below, the requirements of a good tax system are: neutrality
and economic development; taxpayer equity; revenue adequacy, elasticity, and stability; and simplicity of administration and
compliance. A pragmatic approach is taken
here where it is recognized that the state
must fulfill certain
service responsibiliMost state and local
ties financed by taxes
governments deviate
levied on state residents, and at the
from pure neutrality
same time balance
and use part of their
the sometimes comtax system to
peting goals of tax
encourage economic
policy.
In
short,
development,…
the question isn’t
whether to tax or not
to tax, but instead how to best structure the
state’s tax system to realize various tax policy goals. In the following discussion, the
various concepts are explained and policy
tradeoffs are generally noted.

Neutrality and Economic
Development
It is often said that a good tax system should
not distort the decisions made by people and
businesses; in other words, a tax system
should be neutral. For example, a good tax
system should not influence where people
live or what they buy, or how much they
work or save. Similarly, a good tax system

18

should not alter how much a firm invests or
where a firm chooses to place its investment.
All taxes distort some choice or decision, and
taxes in Maine are no exception. The state’s
high overall tax burden and its high local
property tax burden clearly influence the
decisions of businesses and households
alike. But this is part of the tradeoff embedded in overall state tax policy. Maine’s high
service costs, which in part reflect the choices made by taxpayers, coupled with its desire
for a fair tax system, necessarily give rise to
relatively high tax burdens.
The notion of neutrality is in conflict with a
separate policy goal, namely the promotion
of economic development. In recent years
neutrality seems to have been displaced by
the buzzword competitiveness. Most state and
local governments deviate from pure neutrality and use part of their tax system to
encourage economic development, as with
the double-weighted sales apportionment
formula used by Maine under the corporate
excise tax. (See the discussion of the corporate income tax below and the example on
apportionment.) In such instances the policy
goal is not neutrality with respect to other
taxing jurisdictions, but instead a potentially
lower tax burden that will encourage job and
income creation.
Maine’s relatively high overall tax burden
increases tax-induced distortions and nonneutralities vis-a-vis other states. In other
words, taxes alter behavior. Anecdotes
abound regarding the distortionary effects of
Maine’s personal income tax and the way it
discourages residency and may encourage
noncompliance. Similar stories surface
regarding business taxes. The Business
Equipment Tax Rebate (BETR) program
administered by the state and the Tax
Increment Finance (TIF) program administered by local governments have created a
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storm of controversy.9 The public views
these programs largely as corporate welfare
while the business community views the
same programs as a necessary means of tax
reduction (particularly with respect to the
personal property tax) to ensure competitiveness. High rates of property taxation,
especially in service centers, are a source of
the problem and are likely contributing to
sprawl, further aggravating the service-center problem as people and businesses seek to
avoid high taxes. The income tax, with its
rapid progression to the top bracket rate,
makes other locations look attractive relative
to Maine (especially New Hampshire), even
for middle-income taxpayers.
Policymakers must make explicit choices
regarding the degree of tax structure neutrality, and the extent to which tax policy in general and specific programs (including incentives) will be used to promote economic
development. The key to a truly neutral tax
structure is broad bases and low tax rates.
This requires a variety of taxing instruments
and the discipline to avoid granting tax preferences to specific taxpayer groups.
On the other hand, promoting economic
growth through the use of tax policy and/or
incentives requires a different strategy.
Economic development goals and objectives
must first be identified. The goals may be
very general in nature, such as calling for the
creation of high-wage jobs; goals may also be
very specific, as with specific job targets for
specific regions of the state. The next step is
consideration and evaluation of specific poli-

9

cies, including tax policies, that are candidates for use. There should be a clear linkage
between the tax in question and the economic development goal. For example, if the goal
is job creation, then there should be a clear
and explicit linkage between the tax and a
firm’s willingness to hire workers. Similarly,
if the goal is to promote capital investment,
tax policy must have a clear and direct
impact on a firm’s propensity to make investments. The economic development benefits
that are expected to accrue from policy
change, including jobs, incomes, earnings
and new private sector investments, all need
to be evaluated. This would include the jobs,
incomes and investments for those enterprises directly influenced by tax (or incentive)
policy, as well as economic activity influenced through the ripple effects of the multiplier. Finally, effects on state and local revenues, including both short-term yield effects
and longer-term effects on elasticity, as well
as state and local service costs, need to be isolated. Lower taxes or incentives will give rise
to a direct revenue cost. At the same time,
increased economic activity will expand tax
bases and increase tax collections. Increased
economic development activity also brings
about costs, especially if job opportunities
attract workers and families to the state,
requiring expanded public service delivery.

Adequacy, Elasticity
and Stability
State government must have adequate revenue to fund its service obligations, includ-

State programs are now evaluated by the Maine Economic Development Incentive Commission. For a review of the state’s business assistance programs (i.e., BETR, TIF), see “The Effects of Business Assistance Programs on Employment Growth in Maine Establishments,”
which Todd M. Gabe, Department of Resource Economics and Policy, University of Maine, prepared for the Maine Economic Development
Incentive Commission, July 2000. Also see “Maine’s Economic Development Subsidies in 1998-99: Tax Credits Yield Few Jobs at High Cost
Per Job,” by Marc Breslow, State Tax Notes, November 12, 2001: 533-44; and “Tax Increment Finance in Maine,” by Charles Roundy, Maine
Center for Economic Policy, 1997.
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ing intergovernmental transfers to lower levels of government. Once the state determines
the scope of its service responsibilities, the
tax system should produce adequate revenues to finance these same activities without creating planning difficulties and service
interruptions. Adequacy is essentially a question of how big government should be.
Elasticity is the counterpart to adequacy
that captures how strongly revenues grow
over long periods of time. It reflects the
responsiveness of tax revenue to growth in
the tax base, using a constant tax rate and
common definition of the tax base. 10
Stability, on the other hand, reflects only
the short-run performance of revenues
over the ups and downs of the business
cycle. Stability is the short-run counterpart
to elasticity. A highly elastic tax system
will produce strong revenue growth during
periods of expansion, while revenue
growth will fall off appreciably when
growth declines. The opposite holds true
for inelastic tax systems.
Unfortunately, current estimates of elasticity for overall state taxes and specific taxes
are not available for Maine or other New
England states.11 In many instances a surrogate measure of the tax base is used, most
commonly income. For example, when
examining the elasticity of the sales tax, reference is usually made to growth in personal income, where personal income is used as
the proxy for the base of the sales tax. It is
not a perfect measure; for example, it omits
the way in which out-of-state households and

20

business spending in the state influences
taxable sales and sales tax collections.
A tax, or a set of taxes, is deemed to be elastic if taxes are responsive to growth in
income. More precisely, a tax is elastic or relatively responsive if the percentage change
in tax revenue exceeds the percentage
change in income. In the instance of an elastic tax, the measure of elasticity exceeds 1.0.
On the other hand, a tax is inelastic if it is
unresponsive to growth in the tax base, or if
the percentage change in tax revenue is less
than the percentage change in income. In
this instance, the measure of elasticity is less
than 1.0. The concept of elasticity can be
applied similarly to other taxes, including
the corporate income tax.
The importance of elasticity surfaces in the
context of financing state services over the
course of time. If revenue grows more rapidly than service delivery needs, there may
be the fiscal flexibility to reduce taxes. On
the other hand, if revenue grows too slowly,
rate increases or base expansions are
required. In practice the notion of elasticity
is closely interwoven with taxpayer preferences for government services and hence
the spending side of the budget, as with its
annual counterpart adequacy. High revenue elasticity can lead to an increase in
the size of government relative to the private sector. Low revenue elasticity can lead
to difficulties in funding government services and a contraction in the relative size of
the public sector.

10

Alternatively, the concept of buoyancy is used to reflect revenue responsiveness when tax rates and/or tax bases are subject to change.
Buoyancy can easily be measured using actual data on revenue collections.

11

A major difficulty in developing elasticity estimates is accounting for the myriad rate and base changes embedded in historical revenue data
both within and across states. One overall estimate indicates Maine has the ninth highest elasticity of any state in the country. See The
Outlook for State and Local Finances: The Dangers of Structural Deficits to the Future of American Education, by the National Education
Association, 1998.
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Different taxes perform differently over time
based on their specific structure and underlying economic dynamics. Maine’s personal
income tax has been instrumental in supporting strong revenue growth during periods of growth—due in part to the rapid
degree of progressivity inherent in the rate
structure—but it should not be allowed to
become more elastic. The corporate income
tax has not grown as rapidly for a variety of
reasons, including creative tax planning
practices on the part of corporations, as discussed more fully below.
In part, Maine chose to reduce the sales tax
rate to reduce the overall elasticity of the tax
system. But the sales tax elasticity is subject
to many external threats that must be recognized when making state-level policy decisions. First, revenues are eroding due to
shifts in the economy, most notably growth
in the service sector. Second, the federal government has refused to address the states’
problem of collecting sales tax on mail order
sales, and has created a roadblock to sales
taxation of electronic commerce. Finally,
due to competitive pressures from beyond
the state’s border, more exemptions are
being extended to business. Clearly Maine’s
entire sales tax base is not at risk, but a significant share is. For example, as noted
below, estimates indicate a $57.8 million loss
in sales tax revenue in 2001 due to electronic commerce alone.
Finally, there are the selective sales taxes—
such as specific levies on specifically enumerated transactions—that generally show
slow growth over time and have relatively
small elasticities. Fees and user charges,
such as fuel taxes, grow as a result of growth
in the number of gallons of gasoline sold, but
the higher value of gasoline is not captured
in the tax base. Simple fees and excise taxes,
by applying tax to the units consumed rather

than the value of purchases, generally grow
slowly relative to economy-wide growth. A
good tax system will have a variety of taxes
that together produce the desired rate of
overall revenue growth.
Maine’s tax system has been criticized for its
relatively high elasticity, driven heavily by
the performance of the personal income tax.
While there may be some room to lower the
overall system elasticity, policy changes
Maine’s tax system
should proceed slowly
has been criticized for
and recognize the
its relatively high elasexternal forces at play
ticity, driven heavily by
that will influence
long-term
revenue the performance of the
growth absent policy
personal income tax.
change. A relatively
strong revenue elasticity is needed to fund
services and investments that had been compromised during periods of poor revenue
performance, and replenish rainy day fund
balances. Estimates of changes in revenue
elasticity should accompany all major
changes in state tax policy.
State government would like a tax system
that produces a stable flow of revenue over
the ups and downs of the business cycle.
This avoids the need to cut services or raise
taxes during periods of economic contraction, and minimizes the accumulation of
large surpluses during periods of expansion.
But no single tax, nor any overall tax system,
is truly stable. During periods of economic
decline, income and profit growth slows, in
turn depressing revenue growth from the
personal and corporate income tax.
Similarly, consumers retrench and avoid
purchasing big-ticket items (such as homes,
home furnishings and automobiles), while
businesses choose to postpone investments,
depressing sales tax revenue.
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A properly balanced tax system, one that
relies on a variety of taxes that perform differently over the ups and downs of the business cycle, can minimize but not eliminate
instability. Similarly, specific taxes, through
the choice of the tax rate and tax base, can be
designed to minimize but not totally avoid
the instability problem. For example,
depending on the specific services included,
a sales tax that includes services in the base
may be relatively more stable, as spending
on services is largely sustained during economic contraction vis-a-vis the purchase of
manufactured products. On the other hand,
an income tax with progressive rates could
support very strong revenue growth during
periods of economic expansion, yet perform
very poorly in the face of economic decline.
Given other policy objectives, minimizing
instability is the appropriate course to take,
not the entire elimination of instability.
Technically, this requires an analysis of the
covariance of specific taxes and tax policy
options, to determine how a portfolio can be
constructed to minimize instability, in much
the same way financial portfolios are structured to reduce risk.12
Rainy day or budget stabilization funds are
increasingly used across the American states
to help meet spending requirements during
periods of weak revenue growth. These
funds are a relatively new phenomenon, rap-
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idly growing in use following the wrenching
budget experiences of the early to mid1980s. Rainy day funds in Maine were introduced in 1985, with an initial $25 million
statutory cap. Balances as a share of general
fund revenue generally grew through the
1980s, then dipped as they were drawn upon
to meet service needs during the recession
period of 1990. The fund rebounded and by
2000 stood at $143.5 million.13 But the
recent recession caused the state to once
again tap this reserve fund. To close a $90
million gap in the 2001-2002 budget, nearly
$90 million was taken from the reserve fund,
money that had been allocated for the subsequent fiscal year.
Due to the relatively recent introduction of
rainy day funds and the generally strong economic climate that has prevailed across the
nation since their inception, there is little
firm agreement on the optimal size of the balance, nor how funds should be drawn upon
during periods of acute need.14 A rule of
thumb of 5% has been suggested, but recent
analysis suggests states should structure
rainy day funds to meet their own unique
needs and circumstances.15 One thing is certain: rainy day funds are here to stay. In
order to properly support and maintain fund
balances it is essential that revenue growth
during periods of economic expansion is relatively strong, allowing diversion of tax proceeds. In practice this requires a more elastic

12

In this context, covariance is the way in which different taxes move with respect to one another during a period of contraction or a period
of expansion. While taxes are generally cyclical, growing during expansions and slowing or contracting during periods of weak growth, some
taxes are highly unstable while others are relatively stable. A stable tax portfolio includes a mix of taxes where the volatility of one tax instrument is offset by the stability of another.

13

See www.state.me.us./legis/ofpr/compendium00.htm, page 50.

14

See “When it Rains it Pours: A Look at the Adequacy of State Rainy Day Funds and Budget Reserves,” by Iris J. Lav and Alan Berube,
State Tax Notes, May 17, 1999. Also see “Intergovernmental Aspects of Growth and Stabilization Policy,” by William F. Fox and Matthew N.
Murray, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Perspectives and Prospects, Kluwer, 1997.

15

See “What’s So Magical About Five Percent? A Nationwide Look at the Factors that Influence the Optimal Size of Rainy Day Funds,”
by Philip G. Joyce, Public Budgeting and Finance, Summer 2001: 62-87.
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revenue structure than otherwise would be
required to solely fund ongoing services.

Taxpayer Equity
Fairness in taxation is an essential element
of a fiscal system. In the state of Maine tax
fairness has taken center stage as one of the
most important policy considerations in the
design and reform of state and local taxes.
Concerns over fairness and equity have contributed to a highly complex and less-thantransparent tax system.
Of course fairness is in the eyes of the
beholder. One concept of fairness argues
that taxes should reflect the benefits one
receives from government services. This is
an extension of the logic of the private market, where people freely purchase goods
based on the price they pay and the benefits
they derive from consumption. The benefits-received concept is the foundation for
user charges such as gasoline taxes and park
fees. User fees are a particularly good means
to finance government services directly and
uniquely received by individual taxpayers.
They are less appropriate when government
services jointly benefit a large number of
citizens and the benefits for any one taxpayer are obscured. Examples include public
safety, public health and policies to protect
the environment.
User fees and benefit charges are often criticized as ignoring an individual’s ability to
pay, which is typically measured by an individual’s or household’s income. For example,
low-income individuals do not have the
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same ability to pay gasoline taxes and park
fees as do high-income individuals, and this
may be viewed as unfair. At the same time,
many view similar tax liabilities as fair to the
extent ability to pay is similar. There are two
well-accepted measures of tax fairness based
on the notion of ability to pay.16 The first is
horizontal equity, or the way in which similar
individuals and households are treated by
the tax system. Horizontal equity calls only
for the equal treatment of equals, something
most people would find to be an acceptable
measure of fairness. Horizontal equity is violated when two individuals or two households that are otherwise similar confront different tax burdens. In practice, similar is
often taken to mean the same income,
although adjustments for other factors such
as family size may be taken into account.
Horizontal inequities can easily result in a
state tax system. For example, two households with the same income and same number of family members may purchase a different mix of sales taxable and non-taxable
goods and services, and hence pay a different amount of sales tax. This might reflect a
different mix of in-state purchases, or alternatively one household buying via mail
order, over the Internet, or through border
purchases. (This example assumes that individuals bear the burden of the sales and
income taxes.) Horizontal inequities also
result at the local level in Maine, such as
when otherwise similar households confront
different local property tax burdens depending on where they reside.
The second notion of fairness is vertical equity,
or the way in which taxpayers with differing

In discussions of fairness and equity it is important to distinguish between the statutory liability of a tax and who ultimately bears the burden
or incidence of the tax. For example, corporations may nominally pay income taxes, but some of this tax burden might be shifted forward to
consumers in the form of higher prices, or shifted backward to workers in the form of lower wages. In such an instance, the firm’s statutory
tax liability overstates its true economic tax liability, and consumers and workers are said to share in the incidence of the tax.
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abilities to pay, again typically measured by
income, are treated by the tax system. A tax is
said to be progressive if taxes as a share of
income rise as income grows, regressive if taxes
as a share of income fall when income grows,
and proportional if taxes remain a constant
share of income. Unfortunately, it is impossible to make an objective statement on
whether a tax should be proportional, progressive or regressive. Progressive taxes were popular decades ago as governments sought to
redistribute income away from higher income
taxpayers toward the lower end of the income
distribution. But there
has been significant
…there has been
movement away from
significant moveprogressive taxation
ment away from
due to the adverse
incentive effects they
progressive taxation
engender, particularly
due to the adverse
the incentives to work
incentive effects
and save, and residenthey engender…
tial location choice.
Incentive effects are
especially important at the state and regional
level, where high taxes and individual mobility may lead to an exodus of high-income taxpayers. Regressive taxes are viewed by many
as unfair since the poor pay a higher share of
income in tax than higher income taxpayers,
even though higher income taxpayers may
pay more in total taxes.
Income taxes can be progressive, regressive
or proportional depending on how they are
17

designed. The ultimate burden of the income
tax depends on its rate and base structure,
the presence of any credits, deductions,
exemptions, and the incidence of the tax. Flat
taxes, despite the common flat rate, can produce a progressive tax burden. For example, a
flat-rate income tax of 4% with an exemption
per taxpayer of $20,000 would yield a mildly
progressive tax despite the flat rate. In this
instance an individual earning $10,000 per
year would pay no tax, whereas an individual
earning $30,000 would pay $400 in tax (or 4%
of income above the exemption threshold of
$20,000). Maine’s income tax is progressive
due to the presence of exemptions and a progressive rate structure.
Sales and selective sales taxes are generally
viewed as having a regressive tax burden.17
A primary reason is that lower-income people spend essentially all they earn and often
draw down savings to support current spending (so that in some instances spending may
actually exceed income). Hence low-income
people will confront relatively high sales tax
burdens vis-a-vis current income.18 Higherincome individuals, on the other hand, save
some income, thus avoiding a sales tax burden on the saved share of income, and may
spend more on non-taxable services (i.e.,
education tuition). These same individuals
then would have a lower sales tax burden relative to income. The sales tax burden can be
made less regressive by exempting those
items that lower income households dispro-

This discussion assumes that consumers ultimately bear the burden or incidence of the sales tax, as is typically assumed. In reality this
may not be the case for at least two reasons. First, retailers operating in border areas where adjacent jurisdictions have lower sales tax
rates may be compelled to lower their prices to sustain trade. In this instance the retailer may enjoy lower markups and hence lower profits
than their cross-border counterpart. Accordingly, retailers share in the economic burden or incidence of the sales tax. Second, many purchases made by businesses are subject to sales tax, and some of this burden may be borne by businesses through lower profits or by workers
through lower wages.
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Some research has explored lifetime income versus current (or calendar year) income, and the way this influences the progressivity
or regressivity of taxes. Generally, sales and special excise taxes become less regressive when lifetime income is used as a measure
of ability to pay. See, for example, Who Bears the Lifetime Burden, by Don Fullerton and Diane Lim Rogers, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, 1993.
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portionately consume, such as food and
clothing. The primary drawbacks of this
approach include the higher costs of administering and complying with the tax system,
and the poor targeting (to include all taxpayers versus just the needy), which raises the
revenue costs of low-income taxpayer relief.
A good example is Maine’s sales tax policy
toward food, which is a complicated system
to administer and with which to comply.
These costs are just one price Maine pays to
use the sales tax as a means of achieving
equity objectives.

since the former have historically been
holders of equity stock. But this is changing
more and more as middle-to-low income
households have increased their access to
the stock market. It is generally agreed that
corporation and business taxes are inappropriate means of achieving equity objectives
in the economy of today.
Figure 1 illustrates the combined state and
local tax burden for states in the region,
focusing on the lowest 20% of taxpayers (i.e.,
non-elderly married couples) and the top
one percent of taxpayers. This offers one
perspective on vertical equity in Maine and
across the New England states. Maine finds
itself roughly in the middle-to-high range of
the region in terms of tax burdens on lowincome taxpayers, but is well below the U.S.
average. The state’s tax burden on the top 1%

Recent evidence shows that owners of corporations likely pay most of corporate
income taxes, although these findings are
controversial.19 Corporate franchise and
excise taxes are likely borne more by higher
income than lower income individuals,

Figure 1: State and Local Tax Burden, Lowest 20 Percent Income
Group and Top 1 Percent Income Group, 1995
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Note: These data are for non-elderly married couples and account for federal deductibility, which
means the effective tax rate is somewhat reduced.
Source: “Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States,” published by
Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, June 1996.
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See “Who Bears the Burden of the Corporate Tax in the Open Economy?” by Jane Gravelle and Ken Smetters, National Bureau of Economic
Research, working paper 8280, May 2001.
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of taxpayers (7.2%) is almost 25% higher
than the national average (5.8%). Within the
region, only Rhode Island imposes a higher
burden on high-income taxpayers.

are taken into account that disproportionately benefit lower-income groups. Overall, state
and local taxes yield a regressive system for
low-income taxpayers, a proportional burden
for those in the middle-income range, and a
progressive burden for those at the top.

Maine Revenue Services now conducts an
incidence and distribution analysis of tax
burdens for state and local taxes. Due to difficulties and uncertainties regarding the distributional burden of business taxes, they are
not assigned to specific income classes. Table
4 shows their analysis for 1998. The personal income tax is consistently progressive
across all income classes, adding the greatest
degree of progressivity to the overall tax system. The sales tax is mildly regressive and
then burdens flatten out in the higher
income classes. Aside from the lowest
income group, where the data are most questionable, the state tax system produces a
roughly proportional burden, with modest
progressivity at the top. The local property
tax is regressive, even when relief programs

The best means of addressing equity and
fairness is to focus directly on the ability to
pay of specific taxpayers. The best policy
instrument is a direct tax like the income
tax, as opposed to an indirect tax like the
sales tax. Using a direct tax, policy can focus
on the specific circumstances of the taxpayer, including income and family size. By
using an indirect tax, policy is complicated
because the targeted group may be difficult
to identify or distinguish from other taxpayers. This is the case with the sales tax and
the well-intentioned policies of removing
food and clothing from the tax base, or in
Maine’s case, of removing grocery store food.
The policy can in fact help low-income

Table 4: Maine Effective Tax Rates by Income Range and Tax Type, 1998
Expanded Income Range

Family

Personal
Income
Tax

Consumer
Sales
Tax

Consumer
Excise
Tax

Total
State
Taxes

Local Property
Tax on
Individuals

0 - $9,999

93,701

0.2

7.5

3.2

10.9

11.1

-1.9

20.0

10,000 - 19,999

77,044

0.8

4.0

2.0

6.9

6.6

-0.8

12.6

20,000 - 29,999

67,895

1.6

2.6

1.1

5.3

5.2

-0.5

9.9

30,000 - 49,999

112,120

2.5

2.2

0.8

5.5

3.6

-0.3

8.8

50,000 - 74,999

82,864

3.6

1.9

0.6

6.1

2.9

-0.2

8.9

75,000 - 99,999

34,857

4.1

1.6

0.6

6.3

2.5

-0.1

8.7

100,000 - 199,999

26,988

4.7

1.4

0.5

6.7

2.2

-0.1

8.8

7,081

6.4

1.9

0.5

9.6

1.1

-0.0

10.7

502,550

3.7

2.1

0.8

6.7

3.2

-0.3

9.6

> 200,000
Total

Property Tax
Total
Relief
State and
Programs Local Taxes

Note: Data problems plague the lowest income group, so caution is warranted in making inferences for this group. Business
taxes, including corporate income and property taxes on businesses, are unassigned to specific income groups and are omitted here from the total burdens as well. Property tax relief includes the Residents Property Tax Program, Homestead
Exemption and BETR.
Source: “Maine Tax Incidence Study,” published by Maine Revenue Services, December 2000.

26

Tax Policy and Economic Development in Maine: A Survey of the Issues

households, but not without cost. In fact, all
households benefit, not only low-income
households, so foregone revenue is higher
than would otherwise be the case. The local
property tax also has been complicated by
the presence of the homestead exemption
and the state-operated residents relief program. Yet these programs can, with proper
reporting information from taxpayers, target
relief to desired groups.
When the state pursues equity objectives,
reliance should be placed on the income tax
to the extent possible. Generally, the distributional effects of significant policy
changes need to be evaluated, as do the
other consequences of changes to state and
local tax policy. All of the consequences
need to be identified and evaluated to
enable informed policy choice.

Simplicity of Administration
and Compliance
Important tax policy objectives include
simplicity and transparency. In practice,
taxes are costly to the state to administer
and are costly to households and businesses to comply with. Tax complexity is the
primary source of high costs and arises
from special provisions in the tax system,
including multiple tax rates/brackets,
exemptions, deductions, preferential treatment of specific taxpayer groups and so on.
A tax with a single rate and uniform base,
on the other hand, is relatively easy to
administer and comply with, and it is transparent to taxpayers. The special provisions
that yield complexity often arise from the
pursuit of other tax policy goals, such as tax
equity (e.g., the removal of grocery food
from the sales tax base) and competitiveness (e.g., the BETR program).

The Maine tax system, with its portfolio of
tax instruments and special provisions, is
probably somewhat more difficult to administer and comply with than the tax systems
of most other states. These same complications can make it difficult for taxpayers to
see the true effects of the tax system they
confront. (The absence of a broad-based
state income tax in neighboring New
Hampshire likely increases the perceived
compliance burden of Maine’s tax system
further.) Tax simplification has not been a
major driving force for reform in Maine. Still,
it is an important policy consideration. High
tax compliance burdens, coupled with relatively high effective tax rates, add to the distortionary effects of Maine’s tax system.

Policy Tradeoffs
A good tax system would be easy to construct if the aforementioned criteria were
not in frequent conflict with one another. A
good example is what is referred to as the
equity-efficiency tradeoff, discussed above
in the context of tax progressivity and economic development. In order to provide lowincome household tax relief through an
income tax, revenue losses must be made up
by imposing higher taxes on high-income
households. The high-income households
may respond by working and saving less,
since the rewards to these efforts may be
reduced, or by leaving the state for a lower
tax place of residency. Another example is
the exemption of grocery store food from the
base of the sales tax. This further destabilizes
the tax system over the ups and downs of the
business cycle, since food is a stable consumption item for most households, leads to
sharply higher costs of administration and
compliance, and raises the revenue cost of
low-income taxpayer relief by benefiting all
consumers (including non-residents).
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Summary
Maine residents must make choices regarding the desired goals for their tax system,
with the knowledge of the tradeoffs to which
these goals give rise. If economic development and competitiveness are the most
important policy objectives, than they will
need to be pursued at least to some extent at
the expense of other policy objectives. In
practice this may require lower taxes on footloose capital and upper-income taxpayers,
with either service delivery cuts or higher
taxes on other residents of the state. If vertical equity remains a primary goal, the costs
and consequences of related policy choices
should be well documented. It would appear
that the pursuit of equity could be simplified, improving transparency and lowering
both administrative and compliance costs.
The fact is that the tax system and policies
towards economic development need to
reflect the preferences and tastes of residents. This is largely why the tax systems of
the fifty states differ so markedly.
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PA R T

F O U R

Some Facts and Figures
on Government Finances

T

T HE

ABOVE DISCUSSION ABOUT
policy goals and the requirements of a good
tax system provides a useful framework for
reviewing government finances in Maine.
This section begins with some brief comments about the expenditure side of the government budget. Next is a discussion of ownsource taxes in Maine and other states, and a
comparison of tax burdens across Maine and
other states in New England.

Public Expenditures
This report deals with taxes, largely ignoring
the expenditure side of state and local budgets. But when practical public policies are
developed, they must recognize both the tax
and the expenditure sides of the budget. The
typical assumption used to justify an analysis only of taxes is that the expenditure side
of the budget has been set and the goal is to
simply identify the best means of financing
these services. If only the problem were this
simple. In reality taxes and expenditures are
clearly interwoven.
Maine’s taxes are high because the state
seeks to provide quality public services and
must overcome the diseconomies of scale
associated with a modestly sized and spatially dispersed population. In part, state taxes
are high because the state has assumed a primary role in financing local education services through intergovernmental aid. Local
taxes, namely local property taxes, are relatively high in part because of the service cen-

ter problem. The service center problem arises because municipalities are the primary
source of public service provision at the local
level and there is a fundamental mismatch
between service needs and municipal tax
capacity (i.e., the ability to raise taxes and
fees from existing tax bases). For example,
services such as public health may be provided to non-residents of a municipality, but the
municipality itself must fund the same service. Often the municipality is the home to
non-taxable entities
such as hospitals and
…solving the bigger
charities that reduce
puzzle of tax policy
effective local properand economic
ty tax capacity.

development will
also require a
reconsideration of
the structure and role
of state and
local spending.

While this report
focuses on taxes, state
intergovernmental aid
and the expenditure
side of state and local
government budgets
cannot be ignored in
practice. Taxes are a piece of the puzzle, and
an important piece. But solving the bigger
puzzle of tax policy and economic development will also require reconsideration of the
structure and role of state and local spending.
This will not be an easy puzzle to solve.

Own-Source Funds
Table 5 provides a breakdown of budgeted
general fund revenue for fiscal years 2002
and 2003, and the 2002-2003 biennium. The
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most striking feature of the data is the
important—if not dominant—role of the
sales and use tax and the personal income
tax in financing general fund expenditures
of the state. The sales tax accounts for about
one-third of all general fund revenue, while
the individual income tax accounts for
nearly one-half of all revenue. Together the
sales and individual income taxes represent
well over 80% of all general fund budgeted
revenue. The corporate income tax will
contribute nearly $120 million in revenue
fiscal year 2003, or 4.5% of general fund
revenue. Cigarette and tobacco tax revenue
represents over 3.5% of general fund revenue and other revenue sources account for
over 5% of revenue.

in the region, as well as the U.S., to better
place Maine’s finances in perspective. What
is striking is the dramatic increase in reliance
on the personal income tax between 1970
and 2000. While the income tax accounted
for only 9.1% of own-source taxes in 1970, by
2000 the share had jumped to 40.5%, moving
Maine to seventeenth place in the nation.
Maine and the New England states generally
rely more on the personal income tax than is
the case for the average state. The simple
average of personal income tax shares shows
New England to be slightly less reliant on the
personal income tax than the U.S. But the
weighted average (not shown) places New
England’s personal income tax share at
45.1%, substantially ahead of the national
weighted average of 34.9%. General sales and
gross receipts taxes have declined in relative
importance, but still accounted for 31.8% of

Relative reliance on broad tax categories is
shown in Table 6 for Maine and other states

Table 5: General Fund Budgeted Revenue
FY02

Source

FY03

Dollars

Percent

Dollars

Percent

Dollars

Percent

859,893,181

34.27%

910,218,938

34.47%

1,770,112,119

34.37%

Individual income tax

1,211,512,177

48.28%

1,299,107,049

49.20%

2,510,619,226

48.75%

Corporate income tax

117,754,012

4.69%

119,212,477

4.51%

236,966,489

4.60%

Cigarette & tobacco tax

91,410,131

3.64%

99,449,755

3.77%

190,859,886

3.71%

Public utilities tax

30,100,000

1.20%

29,300,000

1.11%

59,400,000

1.15%

Insurance company tax

43,381,856

1.73%

40,924,003

1.55%

84,305,859

1.64%

Inheritance & estate tax

32,561,478

1.30%

34,145,209

1.29%

66,706,687

1.30%

Property tax - unorg. terr.

9,278,895

0.37%

9,845,047

0.37%

19,123,942

0.37%

Income from investments

22,000,000

0.88%

16,850,000

0.64%

38,850,000

0.75%

Trans. to muni. rev. share

-111,647,128

-4.45%

-120,082,728

-4.55%

-231,729,856

-4.50%

Transfer from liquor

22,290,548

0.89%

24,611,840

0.93%

46,902,388

0.91%

Transfer from lottery

36,762,402

1.47%

36,809,911

1.39%

73,572,313

1.43%

143,984,120

5.74%

140,070,292

5.30%

284,054,412

5.52%

2,509,281,672

100.00%

2,640,461,793

100.00%

Sales and use tax

All other
Total revenue

Source: Maine Bureau of Budget, www.state.me.us/budget/web-charth-gfrev.pdf.
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5,149,743,465 100.00%

tax revenue in 2000, slightly below the U.S.
average but ahead of most states in New
England. While the nation and the region saw
the corporate income tax decline in relative
importance between 1970 and 2000, the tax
increased as a share of Maine revenue over
the same time period. Maine’s use of selective sales taxes has lagged the region, while
the use of other taxes has lagged both the
nation and the region over time, suggesting
there is some flexibility to expand taxes in
this direction if necessary.

Tax Burdens
Nominal (or current dollar) state and local
taxes per capita for 1970 and 1999 are reported in Table 7 for Maine, other New England
states and the nation as a whole. Taxes per
capita are a convenient means of comparing
tax burdens across jurisdictions. However,
there are two important limitations of such
measures. First, taxes per capita do not
reflect the ability to pay taxes, which as
noted above is an important basis for making

Table 6: Distribution of State Taxes, 1970 and 2000
General Sales
and Gross Receipts

Percent

National Rank

Selective
Sales

Percent

Corporate
Ta x e s

National Rank

Percent

National Rank

1970

2000

1970

2000

1970

2000

1970

2000

1970

2000

1970

2000

ME

40.1

31.8

8

23

31.6

12.9

19

36

6.1

7.1

33

26

CT

34.9

33.6

23

20

34.8

16.1

12

19

16.9

5.1

5

44

MA

12.1

22.1

45

42

25.6

9.3

35

48

17.2

8.7

4

18

NH

0.0

0.0

50

50

66.2

32.8

12

1

3.2

21.5

44

3

RI

34.3

30.5

24

28

34.6

18.8

13

11

11.9

5.5

10

41

VT

12.6

14.6

44

45

36.1

17.4

10

16

4.9

4.4

40

46

NE

22.3

22.1

38.2

17.9

10.0

8.7

US

29.6

32.3

27.3

14.4

10.5

8.5

Individual
Income

Percent
1970

Other
Licenses

National Rank

Percent

2000

1970

2000

1970

Other
Ta x e s

National Rank

2000

Percent

National Rank

1970

2000

1970

2000

1970

2000

ME

9.1

40.5

35

17

9.0

3.6

19

27

4.2

4.1

28

24

CT

0.7

39.1

42

20

7.0

2.7

31

38

5.7

3.5

18

27

MA

37.2

56.0

5

2

4.5

2.2

45

47

3.4

1.8

38

38

NH

3.7

3.9

39

42

17.1

5.3

2

10

9.8

36.5

10

3

RI

8.2

40.7

37

15

7.2

2.7

29

40

3.9

1.8

31

36

VT

32.3

29.4

9

35

10.7

3.3

10

32

3.3

30.9

39

4

NE

15.2

34.9

9.3

3.3

5.1

13.1

US

19.1

36.0

7.0

3.5

6.6

5.1

Source: 2000 data from U.S. Bureau of the Census Web site: www.census.gov; 1970 data from U.S. Bureau of
the Census: “State Tax Collections,” 1971.
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equity evaluations. Second, it assumes taxes
are borne by in-state residents, when in fact
some share of taxes may be exported to nonresidents. The data show that Maine’s combined state and local tax burden was $379 in
1970, or 88.6% of the New England average,
and was 10% lower than the national average. By 1999 state and local taxes had
increased to $3,218, or 97.9% of the regional
average, and were 10% above the national
average. The New England average in 1999
was 112.4% of the national average.
Local tax burdens in Maine were $171 in
1970, rising to $1,215 in 1999. While Maine’s
local tax burden was 83% of the regional
average in 1970, the burden was 96% of New
England’s in 1999. New England’s burden per
capita was almost 12% above the national
average. Maine enjoyed a state tax burden
per capita that was lower than the nation and
New England in 1970. But by 1999 Maine’s
burden was approaching the regional average
and was 111.7% of the national average.

1970 and 2000 is provided in Table 8 for the
New England states. In 2000 Maine’s total
burden of $2,087 placed the state fourteenth
in the nation. New England is known for relatively high taxes, and three regional states
received a top ten ranking in 2000,
Connecticut (first place), Massachusetts
(fifth place) and Vermont (seventh place). It
is interesting that Maine has such a high
overall ranking, while in no instance is its
ranking for a specific tax higher than fifteenth. The rank for Maine’s corporate
income tax has increased substantially over
time (from thirty-third to twentieth), and its
collections per capita have moved closer to—
but still lag—the national average. The burden of the personal income tax has grown
from thirty-seventh in the nation in 1970 to
fifteenth in 2000. Personal income tax collections per capita were 42% of the national
average in 1970, rising to 122.1% in 2000, a
rather remarkable jump. Other taxes per
capita have seen their ranking increase vis-avis the nation.

A detailed breakdown of inflation-adjusted
(or constant dollar) state taxes per capita for

An alternative perspective on state revenue
collections is state taxes as a percent of per-

Table 7: State and Local Taxes Per Capita, New England States and U.S.
State and Local

1999

Local

1970

State

State

1970

1999

1970

1999

ME

$379

$3218

$171

$1215

$208

$2003

CT

484

4403

240

1557

244

2846

MA

496

3528

252

1194

244

2334

NH

331

2546

203

1669

128

877

RI

408

3079

167

1254

241

1825

VT

469

2952

166

655

303

2297

New England

428

3288

200

1257

228

2030

US

426

2925

191

1132

235

1793

Source: Tax data from U.S. Bureau of the Census Web site: www.census.gov. Population data from Bureau of
Economic Analysis Web site: www.bea.doc.gov.
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Table 8: State Taxes Per Capita by Tax Type, 1970 and 2000,
New England States and U.S.
General Sales and
Gross Receipts

Selective
Sales

State

1970

Rank

2000

Rank

1970

Rank

2000

Rank

ME

$325

15

$665

15

$256

24

$270

26

CT

$331

13 $1,004

3

$330

3

$480

4

MA

$115

45

$562

30

$243

34

$235

37

NH

$0

49

$0

48

$330

4

$449

5

RI

$320

17

$593

24

$323

5

$364

13

VT

$149

43

$354

44

$426

2

$420

7

New England $206

$529

$318

$370

US

$621

$250

$277

$271

Corporate
Ta x e s

Individual
Income

State

1970

Rank

2000

Rank

1970

Rank

2000

Rank

ME

$49

33

$148

20

$74

37

$845

15

CT

$160

4

$151

18

$6

42 $1,167

5

MA

$163

3

$221

7

$353

9 $1,424

1

NH

$16

46

$296

3

$18

39

$53

42

RI

$111

11

$106

36

$76

36

$791

16

VT

$58

29

$106

37

$381

8

$709

22

New England

$93

$171

$151

$832

US

$96

$164

$176

$692

Other
Licenses

Other
Ta x e s

To t a l

State

1970

Rank

2000

Rank

1970

Rank

2000

Rank

1970

Rank

2000

ME

$73

18

$75

20

$34

30

$85

22

$810

32

$2,087 14

CT

$67

29

$81

14

$54

17

$103

18

$948

18

$2,986

1

MA

$43

43

$56

37

$32

32

$46

32

$949

17

$2,544

5

NH

$85

10

$72

22

$49

20

$502

4

$498

50

$1,372 47

RI

$67

27

$52

43

$36

26

$36

38

$933

19

$1,942 18

VT

$126

2

$79

16

$39

25

$747

3

$1,178

5

$2,415

New England

$77

$69

$41

$253

$886

$2,224

US

$64

$68

$61

$99

$918

$1,921

Rank

7

Note: 1970 (2000=100)
Source: Tax revenue data from U.S. Bureau of the Census Web site: www.census.gov. Population data from Bureau of
Economic Analysis Web site: www.bea.doc.gov.
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sonal income. Shown in Table 9 are major
state tax categories for 1970 and 2000.
Personal income is a widely used measure of
ability to pay, and also serves to reflect the
size of state government relative to the size
of the private sector.20 Total state taxes in
Maine were 5.5% of personal income in 1970
rising substantially to 8.45% in 2000. In

other words, the size of state government—
measured by state-financed taxes as a share
of personal income—has increased an average of one percentage point per decade over
the past thirty years. In contrast, the U.S.
and New England saw burdens as a share of
income rise by less than a percentage point
over the same thirty-year time period. One

Table 9: State Taxes as a Share of Personal Income, 1970 and 2000,
New England States and U.S.
General Sales
and Gross
Receipts

Selective
Sales

State

1970

2000

1970

2000

ME

2.55

2.68

2.01

1.09

0.39

0.60

CT

1.72

2.54

1.71

1.21

0.83

0.38

MA

0.68

1.56

1.44

0.65

0.97

0.61

NH

0

0

2.23

1.42

0.11

0.93

RI

2.09

2.09

2.11

1.28

0.73

0.37

VT

1.1

1.35

3.14

1.61

0.43

0.40

New England

1.36

1.70

2.11

1.21

0.58

0.55

US

1.76

2.17

1.62

0.97

0.62

0.57

Individual
Income

1970

2000

Corporate
Ta x e s

Other
Licenses

Other
Ta x e s

State

1970

2000

1970

2000

1970

2000

ME

0.58

3.40

0.57

0.30

0.27

CT

0.03

2.95

0.35

0.21

MA

2.09

3.96

0.26

NH

0.12

0.17

RI

0.50

VT

To t a l
Ta x e s

1970

2000

0.34

5.48

8.41

0.28

0.26

6.65

7.55

0.15

0.19

0.13

6.74

7.07

0.58

0.23

0.33

1.58

6.24

4.32

2.79

0.44

0.18

0.24

0.13

7.13

6.84

2.81

2.71

0.93

0.30

0.29

2.86

7.68

9.24

New England

1.02

2.66

0.52

0.23

0.27

0.88

6.65

7.24

US

1.14

2.42

0.41

0.24

0.39

0.35

5.95

6.72

Source: Tax revenue data from U.S. Bureau of the Census Web site: www.census.gov. Personal income data from Bureau of
Economic Analysis Web site: www.bea.doc.gov.
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Christopher St. John provides a nice discussion of recent Census Bureau tax burden figures, arguing that several unique data circumstances,
as well as high service delivery costs, conspired to produce Maine’s number one ranking in 1998. See “The ‘Tax Burden’ Rap Reemerges,”
published by the Maine Center for Economic Policy in Choices, VII, August 22, 2001.
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of the reasons for Maine’s relatively high
burden as a share of personal income is relatively low in-state per capita personal
income. But equally if not more important is
the desire for state spending and aid to local
governments to support education and other
activities. Maine’s general sales and gross
receipts tax burden in 1970 and 2000 is well
above the regional and national norm.
Growth in personal income tax burdens
stands out clearly in these data. Income
taxes in Maine accounted for only 0.6% of
personal income in 1970, jumping to 3.4% in
2000. While the state’s income tax burden
was 50.8% of the national average in 1970,
the burden had spiked to 40.5% ahead of the
national average in 2000.

reflect projections. Note that the data are not
directly comparable to those in Table 9 due
to the methodology employed in the incidence analysis. The general pattern is one of
slow decline in effective burdens for recent
history, and projections of a similar trend
through 2003.

Summary
The facts and figures only highlight the
broadest of trends that have taken place in
Maine government finances in the past thirty years. Some of the changes in revenue
performance over time can be attributed to
shifts in economic fortunes. Still, much of
the change reflects policy decisions made at
the state and local levels in Maine. The most
striking features of the data include Maine’s
rapid growth in revenue (especially income
tax revenue) over the past thirty years, the
rapid growth in the size of state government,
and the relatively high tax burdens compared to peers in the region and states across

Finally, Figure 2 provides a summary of
state, local and combined state and local
effective tax rates (defined as taxes as a percent of income), drawing from Maine
Revenue Service’s tax incidence study. The
first tax incidence study was completed in
2000, so data for that and subsequent years

Figure 2: Maine State and Local Effective Tax Rates, 1996 to 2003
14

Percent of Income

12

11.74

11.55

11.13

11.12

10.8

10.74

10.75

10.66

10
8

7.33

7.25

7.19

7.25

6.98

6.96

6.99

6.95

4.41

4.29

3.94

3.87

3.82

3.78

3.76

3.71

6
4
2

State & Local
1996

1997

1998

State
1999

2000

Local
2001

2002

2003

Note: Years 2000 to 2003 represent projections.
Source: “Maine Tax Incidence Study,” published by Maine Revenue Services, December 2000.
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the nation. The growth in the size of statetax-financed government—up three percentage points in three decades—highlights the
importance of government spending and the
expenditure side of the state budget. The corporate tax has grown in Maine, while the
opposite trend is taking place more broadly
in New England and the U.S. At the same
time, Maine has not utilized selective taxes
to the same extent as other states.
State government in Maine has increasingly
placed reliance on the personal income tax,
while local governments rely almost exclusively on the local property tax for ownsource revenue. Both the state and local tax
systems are now out of balance, in the sense
that reliance now falls heavily on a single
tax instrument. Hence, any shifts in fortunes for the state income tax or the local
property tax can spell disaster for the
financing of services. Moreover, reliance on
a narrow set of tax instruments typically
translates into higher tax rates on existing
tax bases, increasing the likelihood for distortions in economic behavior.

36

Tax Policy and Economic Development in Maine: A Survey of the Issues

PA R T

F I V E

Overview and Analysis
of Major State Taxes

T

THIS

Personal Income Tax

SECTION FOCUSES ON SPECIFIC
state taxes in the state of Maine.21 Key structural features are identified for each major
state tax, using interstate and national comparisons. The requirements for a good tax
structure, discussed above, provide the structure for the discussion of specific policies that
might be considered for each tax instrument.

The Maine personal income tax, like all personal income taxes in the New England
states, uses federal taxable income as the
basis for taxation. A distinguishing feature of
Maine’s personal income tax is its high topbracket rate and the rapid pace of progres-

Figure 3: Top Bracket Rates for Personal Income Tax

8.50

Top Bracket Rate

8
5.85

6

5.00

4.50
4

2

ME

CT

MA

NH

0.25

0.24

RI

VT

Note: Rates are for married taxpayers, filing jointly. The taxable-income threshold for the top rate
is $33,000 in Maine and $20,000 in Connecticut; Massachusetts has a different structure for nonwage income; New Hampshire’s rate applies to interest and dividends only; the percent shown in
Rhode Island and Vermont applies to federal income tax liability.
Source: State Tax Guide, CCH, Inc., 2001.

21

A detailed overview of state taxes is “State of Maine: Compendium of State Fiscal Information,” www.state.me.us./legis/ofpr/compendium00.htm.
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sion to the top rate. Massachusetts makes use
of a flat rate. Connecticut has a progressive
two-rate structure, while Rhode Island and
Vermont achieve some progressivity by
applying a flat rate to federal tax liabilities.
Shown in Figure 3 are the top bracket rates
for married tax payers for the New England
states, including New Hampshire, which has
only a narrow-based personal income tax the
same top rates apply (the same top rates
apply to individual filers as well). Maine’s
rate of 8.5% is the top rate in the region. Only
the District of Columbia and six states—
California, Hawaii, Iowa, Montana, North
Dakota and Oregon—have higher top-bracket
rates. Moreover, the 8.5% rate kicks in at taxable income of $33,000. The high tax rate can
be viewed as an important source of distortion in Maine’s tax system, potentially discouraging residency, entrepreneurship and
the creation of higher wage and salary jobs.

Despite the high rate and the quick pace of
tax progression, low-income taxpayers
appear to receive favorable treatment under
the personal income tax. Figure 4 shows the
lowest level of income at which a two-parent
family of four would confront a state income
tax burden. Maine compares reasonably well
with other states in the region. A better
gauge of tax fairness is offered by Figure 5,
where the income tax burden as a share of
income for broad income classes is displayed. Compared to the U.S., low-income
taxpayers in Maine fare quite well, confronting less than one-half the burden of
their national counterparts. At the same
time, high-income taxpayers face a substantially higher burden than is the case for the
nation as a whole. For the top one percent of
taxpayers the average personal income tax
burden in Maine is 6.5% versus 4.6% for the
nation, a 41% premium.

Figure 4: State Income Tax Thresholds, Two-Parent Families of Four, 2000

25,900
25,000

23,000

26,800

24,100
20,600
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20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000

ME

CT

MA

NH

RI

VT

Note: These thresholds show the lowest income at which a family has state tax liability. The
threshold includes earned income tax credits, other general credits, exemptions and standard
deductions. Credits for other taxes or credits not available to all low-income taxpayers are not
accounted for.
Source: “State Income Tax Burdens on Low-Income Families in 2000,” by Bob Zahradnik,
Nicholas Johnson and Michael Mazerov, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 2001.
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Maine has made the decision to use highly
progressive income tax rates to buy a degree
of tax fairness and it appears to have been
successful. Still, this choice has a price in the
form substantially higher taxes on upperincome individuals and, accordingly, strong
disincentives to earn income in Maine. The
state should continue to use the income tax
as the primary means of achieving equity
objectives at both the state and local level,
but ensure that disincentive effects and
other adverse policy consequences are identified. All efforts to achieve equity objectives
should take into account the effects on other
dimensions of tax policy, including revenue
yield, stability, and so on.

rate and limited liability business structures
(see below). The elasticity of the income tax
should be determined in concert with the
elasticities for other state taxes and overall
state tax structure. As noted elsewhere,
some degree of elasticity should be retained
to support rainy day funds and investments
during times of strong revenue growth.
These and other policy considerations need
to build on a firm foundation of objective
data and analysis.

Taxes on Corporations
Businesses in Maine pay a wide variety of
taxes, depending on the sector of the economy in which they operate and the legal form
of the business entity. Businesses generally
pay gasoline, property, and other taxes,
including sales tax on many business inputs.
Corporate entities pay some form of corporate income tax. Financial institutions are
subject to the Maine franchise tax at the rate
of 8 cents per $1,000 of assets in Maine, plus

The progressive income tax rate structure
has also created a highly elastic and distortionary income tax. Consideration should be
given to flattening the degree of progressivity to reduce both distortions and revenue
elasticity. Rates should be roughly commensurate with corporate income tax rates to
avoid distorting the choice between corpo-

Figure 5: Maine and U.S. Personal Income Tax Burden
by Income Group, 1995
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Corporate Income Apportionment Formulas
An example is perhaps the best means of seeing the
way corporate income apportionment formulas work
in practice. Consider a firm with a multi-state presence
that includes Maine. Assume the firm has total property (P) of $100 million, total payroll (W) of $30 million
and total sales (S) of $40 million across all states. Also
assume that the firm has $7 million of its total property (Pm) in Maine, $3 million of its total payroll (Wm) in
Maine and $1.2 million of its total sales (Sm) in Maine.
The traditional three-factor formula can generally be
written as:
1/3 (Pm/P + Wm/W + Sm/S)

a 1% income tax collected under the umbrella of the corporation income tax. Insurance
companies pay a 2% tax on premiums paid
on policies written in the state; different tax
rates apply to long-term care policies and
group policies. Corporations in other sectors
confront the general corporate income tax.
There is no broad-based state franchise tax
applied to corporate property or stock value
as is the case in many other states in the
nation. Since such state franchise taxes are
effectively variants of a property tax, this is
good for Maine in light of currently high
local property tax rates.

Using the specific figures in this example yields:
1/3 (7/100 + 3/30 + 1.2/40) = .067
So, using the three-factor formula, 0.067% of this firm’s
net income across all states would be allocated to
Maine for tax purposes, while the remaining net
income would be taxed by other states, depending on
allocation formulas in use in other states.
When the apportionment formula is adjusted to accommodate double-weighting of the sales factor, the general apportionment formula becomes:
1/4 (Pm/P + Wm/W + Sm/S + Sm/S)
Using the specific figures in the example yields:
1/4 (7/100 + 3/30 + 1.2/40 + 1.2/40) = .058
In this instance, 0.058%—versus 0.067%—of total net
business income would be taxable in Maine. The result
is a lower tax burden for the firm under double-weighting of sales. The explanation for the lower apportionment factor for this hypothetical firm rests in the fact
that the sales component is small relative to the average of the other components, benefiting export-oriented firms. Firms with a large in-state sales factor, on the
other hand, will see their tax liabilities increase under
double-weighting of the sales component.
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The base of the corporation tax is net business income apportioned to the state. Maine,
like most states in the nation, now makes
use of a double-weighted sales factor for the
apportionment of interstate corporate
income. Historically a uniform rule of apportionment was employed by the states. The
traditional three-factor formula provided
equal weights to a firm’s in-state share of
total property, sales and payroll across all
states. That is, a firm added up the Maine
shares of its property, sales and payroll
across all states within which it operated,
and simply divided by three. The traditional
three-factor formula was simple and transparent, offered a level and nondistortionary
playing field, and ensured that all domestic
income of the corporation was in spirit subject to tax. Uniformity, however, has been
compromised by the pursuit of economic
development goals. The double-weighted
sales factor for corporate income apportionment includes four components. The first
two are the traditional measures of property
and payroll. But in-state sales relative to
nationwide sales now appear in the formula
twice, hence the term double-weighted sales
factor. An illustration of the double-weighted
apportionment formula is provided in the
adjacent box.
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The purpose of applying a double weight to
sales is to encourage the in-state location of
businesses that produce for national markets. These same businesses typically will
have small amounts of in-state sales relative
to sales in the national market, thus apportioning relatively small amounts of interstate
income to the domiciliary state. Several
states have considered and/or adopted single-factor sales apportionment formulas. The
jury is still out on the effectiveness of these
changes in corporate apportionment on economic development. Most analysts see revenue losses and relatively little economic
development gain from shifts away from the
traditional formula.22 The double- and single-weighted sales factors are good examples
of the degree of interstate competition for
business, and the quick policy response that
follows the lead of a single state. The ultimate impact is a lowering playing field for
business once all states adopt the program,
and likely less revenue for the states.
Maine has followed the lead of other states
across the nation by enabling the creation of
limited liability corporations (LLCs), which
offer limited liability like a traditional corporation, but tax income as a pass-through to
the individual income tax. All states now
allow the presence of LLCs. This change in
corporate tax structure was initially perceived to have inconsequential revenue
effects, since income would still be subject to
taxation, albeit at the individual level.
However, anecdotal evidence suggests a
clear revenue loss. For example, the rate

structure and top bracket rate of the Maine
personal income tax suggests that there is a
tax advantage from choosing the LLC form
over the traditional corporate form, even
though the advantage may be small (a 0.43%
difference). Emerging research also suggests
that revenue losses may be larger than first
anticipated.23 This
research builds on
Maine and Vermont
recognition of the
sophisticated
tax each apply a progressive
rate structure to
planning practices
of modern corporacorporate income
tions and the fact apportioned to the state.
that out-of-state corAll other New England
porations (perhaps
states apply a flat rate
without
nexus,
to corporate income.
meaning, the legal
presence to trigger
tax liability) may become owners of in-state
LLCs. By changing organizational forms, it is
argued that corporations can remove from
tax the lion’s share of income that would otherwise be subject to tax. As with doubleweighted sales factors, more research will
need to be undertaken to isolate the magnitude of any revenue losses generally, and for
Maine in particular.
Maine and Vermont each apply a progressive
rate structure to corporate income apportioned to the state. All other New England
states apply a flat rate to corporate income.
In Maine, the lowest rate of 3.5% applies to
taxable income up to $25,000; the top rate of
8.93% applies to corporate income above
$250,000. Vermont’s top rate of 9.75% also

22

See “Strategic Apportionment of the State Corporate Income Tax: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis,” by Kelly Edmiston, National Tax
Journal (forthcoming). Also see “The Single Sales Factor Formula for State Corporate Income Taxes: A Boon to Economic Development or
Costly Giveaway?” by Michael Mazerov, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, April 17, 2001. A more general discussion of the details of
corporate apportionment formulas is provided by James K. Smith in “Guide to State Corporate Income Tax Apportionment-Part I,” State Tax
Notes, November 27, 2000 and “Guide to State Corporate Income Tax Apportionment-Part II,” State Tax Notes, December 18, 2000.

23

See “Does the Advent of LLCs Explain Declining State Corporate Tax Revenues?” by William F. Fox and LeAnn Luna, Center for Business
and Economic Research, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, February 2002.
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applies to taxable income in excess of
$250,000. Figure 6 shows the top bracket
rates for the corporate income tax in the New
England states. Maine’s top rate is not out of
line relative to other states within the region.

Tax rates alone do not offer a clear picture of
the effective tax rate (i.e., taxes as a percent
of gross or net income) businesses confront
across states. But estimating effective tax
rates is problematic at best. Figure 7 offers

Figure 6: Top Bracket Rates Corporate Income Tax
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Figure 7: After-Tax Rates of Return
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estimates of after-tax rates of return for
hypothetical investments with gross returns
of 25%. The analysis attempts to account for
corporate taxes, as well as other major business taxes. Maine’s corporate tax burden
reduces the 25% gross return down to
15.1%. By this measure, Maine again does
not appear to be out of line with other states
in the region.
A final perspective on the burden of corporate taxes is offered in Table 10, which shows
tax effort (i.e,. actual corporate tax collections divided by potential collections) for
the New England states. According to this
measure, in 1996 Maine’s effort was the lowest in the region, placing it forty-fourth in
the nation. The reduction in effort, which
took place across all states in the region
between 1986 and 1996, was smallest in
Maine. The largest reductions in effort took
place in those states with the highest prevailing effort (Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire).

The data presented here are sketchy, in
some instances quite dated, and in some
respects inconsistent. The general picture
that does emerge is that Maine’s corporate
tax burden may be reasonable by regional
standards, but within a region characterized
by high taxes by national standards. And
while other states in New England seem to
have worked to lower business tax burdens
(at least between 1986 and 1996), Maine has
not kept up. This likely contributes to criticisms that Maine is a high-tax state and
offers a poor business climate.24 The problem is likely complicated by high local property tax rates which businesses confront,
adding to the overall business tax burden.
Maine residents should ask themselves what
role corporate taxes are expected to play in
state tax structure, and how business taxes
generally are to be used to promote economic development. Corporate tax revenues currently account for a relatively small share of
the state revenue pie (about 4.7% of general

Table 10: Estimated Effective Corporate Tax Effort
1996
Effort

1996
National Rank

1986-96
Effort Change

ME

48.8

44

-4.3

CT

105.8

15

-49.2

MA

118.5

10

-55.3

NH

105.0

16

-13.2

RI

75.0

30

-2.9

VT

55.8

43

-11.7

Source: State Policy Reports 18(22): 2000.

24

On business climate, see the Small Business Survival Index discussed above.
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fund revenue in fiscal year 2002), but are
nonetheless an important component of
total collections. Corporate taxes accounted
for 10.2% of all state’s tax revenue in 1979,
falling to 6.3% in 2000.25 Nationwide, corporate taxes are not expected to be a growing
source of revenue for the states as global and
domestic competition have put downward
pressure on effective tax rates. In addition,
as an esteemed observer of state corporate
tax policy has noted, “new attacks are…
threatening to drain the lifeblood out of the
tax.”26 Most prominent of the new attacks
are pressures for lower rates and targeted
incentives, and sophisticated tax planning
practices that are difficult for states to anticipate and respond to. As Mazerov notes,
between 1995 and 2000 state corporate tax
revenue grew at about half the pace of federal corporate tax revenues, suggesting that a
significant portion of the base is “falling
through the cracks.”27
Several policy issues surface from this
overview of corporate taxes. First is the question of progressive tax rates for the corporate
tax. Presumably the progressive structure is
based on some desired notion of tax fairness.
But if the intent is to redistribute income, the
corporate in-state income tax is a poor vehicle, as it is not at all clear who ultimately
pays the tax. Given the high degree of mobility of capital across the states, especially
those states in a given region of the country,
some of the burden may actually be shifted
to in-state workers in the form of lower earnings or to land owners in the form of lower
rents and land prices.
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If the corporate structure is to remain, analysis should be undertaken to determine the
consequences of revenue-neutral rate flattening. A revenue-neutral change with a flat rate
would support a lower tax rate and would
make Maine’s corporate income tax appear
more attractive by regional and national standards. A lower rate can reduce tax distortions
and send a positive signal regarding state
business climate. As noted above, the rate
structure of the corporate tax must generally
coincide with that of the personal income tax
to avoid distorting the choice over the corporate and LLC business structures.
Second, the state should consider implementation of a business enterprise tax (BET),
akin to that in New Hampshire, as a replacement for the current corporate tax and other
business taxes. The primary reason is that—
as noted above—the traditional state corporate income tax is at risk through creative tax
planning and capital mobility. (A less desirable approach would be to maintain the
existing corporate income tax, but at a lower
rate, and allow crediting of BET against the
corporate tax, per New Hampshire.) Such a
policy change should be roughly revenue
neutral, leading to no significant increase in
business taxes. The corporate tax rate, which
applies to profits, could be flattened and
reduced rather than eliminated in entirely,
while a modest BET rate could be imposed
and collected from all businesses regardless
of firm profitability.

25

See “Closing Three Common Corporate Income Tax Loopholes Could Raise Additional Revenue for Many States,” by Michael Mazerov,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, April 9, 2002.

26

See “The Future of the State Corporate Income Tax: Reflections (and Confessions) of a Tax Lawyer,” by Richard Pomp, State Tax Notes,
March 22, 1999: 939.

27

See “Closing Three Common Loopholes,” by Mazerov, page 3 (footnote 25).
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The New Hampshire BET is in spirit a production-oriented value-added tax.28 The base
of the tax is essentially the disbursement of
income (or value added through production)
on the part of the business entity, the largest
component of which is wage and salary payments (which nationally represent about
60% of personal income). The breadth of the
base allows for low rates of taxation (in New
Hampshire the rate of tax is 0.25%) and
Kenyon argues that tax base growth is superior to the growth in corporate profits. Thus
the BET could enhance the elasticity of business taxes, providing the flexibility to reduce
the elasticity of other state taxes if desired.
The tax is also neutral with respect to firms
in different sectors, to disbursement of different forms of income, and to business structure. All businesses would pay tax (even
those without profit), and the tax would do a
better job of capturing growth in the booming
service sector of the economy. The tax could
allow expensing (i.e., full deduction of the
cost of capital) to encourage investment, a
strategy that would be most appropriate if the
existing corporate tax is eliminated. The base
of the tax would likely prove to be more stable than the base of the existing corporate
income tax. Simplicity is an important virtue,
as with the New Hampshire BET structure.
But like any tax instrument, it is subject to
political pressures and could become exceedingly complicated if used to pursue multiple
policy objectives (e.g., the Michigan singlebusiness tax became exceedingly complex
and is now being phased out).
A major drawback of the BET is that the tax
base is essentially income, which is already
subject to relatively high rates of personal

28

income taxation. Still, it must be recognized
that all taxes fall on either the sources of
income (i.e., a personal income tax) or the
uses of income (i.e., sales and selective excise
taxes). The BET has many advantages that
should be considered when policy change is
considered.
Third, the state should undertake an analysis
of the effective burden of the corporate
income tax, and other state and local taxes, to
identify the magnitude of tax burdens
…the state should
and potential distorconsider implementation
tions across sectors
of the economy.
of a business enterprise
Ideally this would
tax akin to that in New
be done in tandem
Hampshire, as a replacewith
a
similar
ment for the current
analysis in competicorporate tax and other
tor states to deterbusiness taxes.
mine Maine’s relative business tax
burden. This could help guide policy regarding the level of business taxation, as well as
identify specific sectors with relatively high
burdens that might be mitigated in other
ways, including the use of incentives.
Fourth, policies that would erode corporate
tax revenues through incentives or other initiatives should be supported by careful
research. Economic development objectives
should be explicit and measurable, and consequences for revenue yield (i.e., adequacy),
elasticity and other elements of a good tax
structure need to be considered.
Finally, the state tax administration, which is
viewed favorably by the business communi-

For a general discussion of production and consumption value-added taxes (VATs) and the role they might play in state government finance,
see “Issues in the Design and Implementation of Production and Consumption VATs in the American States,” by William F. Fox, LeAnn Luna
and Matthew N. Murray, State Tax Notes, January 21, 2002. For a careful and insightful discussion of the New Hampshire BET, see “A New
State VAT? Lessons from New Hampshire,” by Daphne A. Kenyon, National Tax Journal 49 (1996): 381-99.
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ty, needs to stay on the frontier of corporate
tax planning strategies.29 This will require
great expertise in the tax law and tax accounting arenas. Corporate tax planning may represent the single largest threat to the corporate tax today. Mazerov, for example, identifies the issue of the distinction between
apportionable business income and allocable
non-business income as one of revenue
importance to the state of Maine.30 Pursuing
policy issues of this type is not for the faint
hearted and requires tremendous knowledge
of corporate tax structure and tax law.

having higher tax rates is to enable the
exportation of taxes to nonresidents. The
sales tax in Maine and in other states is perceived to be at risk from a variety of
sources, including traditional mail order
sales, electronic commerce (especially business-to-business, or B2B sales) and targeted
exemptions and incentives granted to business. The tax was designed and implemented in a very different economic and political environment than prevails today. The
tax simply has not kept up with the rapid
pace of economic transition taking place
across the American states.

Sales Tax

Statutory liability for the sales tax falls on
consumers (whether they be firms or individuals), while businesses actually collect
and remit the tax on behalf of buyers.
Collection and remittance obligations fall
only on those business enterprises that have
nexus in the state, generally construed as
some form of physical presence (e.g.,
through the location of a retail or wholesale
facility, or the presence of employees).
Many so-called remote vendors, including
mail order firms and electronic commerce
entities, do not have such a physical presence and are hence not required to collect
tax on sales. Generally, businesses and individuals who purchase taxable goods without
payment of tax are required to pay the complementary use tax in the state of consumption. In Maine this is facilitated for individuals through explicit entries and reporting
requirements on personal income tax forms.

Maine’s sales tax is the second most important state revenue source, accounting for
nearly $860 million in budgeted revenue for
fiscal year 2002. The tax was implemented
in 1952 with an initial
rate of 2%. While
While [sales-tax]
rates have grown subrates have grown
stantially, revenue
substantially, revenue
has not grown at the
has not grown at
same pace for many
the same pace for
reasons,
including
the general shift in
many reasons…
economic structure
toward
largely
nontaxed
services.
Significant changes to the tax have recently
been implemented, most notably a June 1,
2000 rate reduction to 5%. Maine retained
its separate tax rates of 7% and 10% applied
to specific transactions. The 7% rate applies
to liquor sales and the sale of prepared food
in liquor establishments, and room rentals
(a 7% gross receipts tax also falls on nursing
home patient care). Part of the objective of
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Maine’s sales tax rate, as shown in Figure 8,
is relatively low by regional standards,
matching up with the 5% rates in

29

See “Best and Worst of State Tax Administration: COST’s Scorecard,” by Douglas L. Lindholm and Stephen P.B. Kranz, State Tax Notes,
June 18, 2001.

30

See “Closing Three Common Loopholes,” by Mazerov (footnote 25).
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Massachusetts and Vermont, and is consistent with the national median rate across all
states.31 New Hampshire, of course, has no
sales tax, which makes Maine’s rate appear
high, and clearly leads to a leakage of sales
across the border. It is interesting that no
state in New England enables general and
broad-based local option sales taxes.
Vermont does allow local option taxes, but
there are strict restrictions on the definition
of the tax base and receipts must be used to
support education. Thirty-three states do
allow local option sales taxes.

were replaced by retail taxes, and as the
service sector was an inconsequential element of the economy. Most economists
argue that business purchases should be tax
exempt to avoid pyramiding or cascade of tax
through the production chain. That is, when
businesses pay sales tax on purchased
inputs, the sales tax at subsequent stages of
the production process and at the final retail
stage are effectively imposed on sales taxes
earlier in the chain. This means that product prices will differ in part by the amount
of tax embedded in costs, distorting business
input choices and consumer product choices. Taxes on business inputs can also distort
where businesses choose to locate and can
encourage vertical integration to avoid payment of tax. Sales for resale are generally
exempt from sales tax, as are many purchased inputs that are directly conveyed
to consumers as manufactured products.
However, local service providers would pay
sales tax on virtually all business expendi-

The base of the sales tax is a hodgepodge of
goods and services consumed by both individuals and businesses. In general, tangible
goods are subject to tax unless explicitly
enumerated for exemption, while services
are exempt unless specifically enumerated
for inclusion in the base. This practice is a
reflection of the historical origins of the tax,
as wholesale (or manufacturer-based) taxes

Figure 8: Sales Tax Rates, New England States
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Federation of Tax Administrators, January 2002, www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sale_vdr.html.
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tures on tangible goods. Similarly, manufacturers would pay sales tax on construction materials, office supplies and furnishings, and so on.

most recent estimates of the sales tax burden
on businesses and consumers in Maine and
other states in the region. Maine finds itself
in the middle of the New England states and
slightly below the nation, with a business
share of 43%. Using fiscal year 2002’s budgeted sales tax revenue of $859.9 million, this
means that businesses are paying almost
$370 million in sales tax, which is over
three times the amount of tax generated by
the state’s corporate income tax. Pressures
will continue to mount to reduce this tax
burden on business.

It is also argued that the ideal sales tax would
tax all individual and household consumption. The presence of uniform taxes on all
goods and services consumed would not distort choices made by consumers, aside from
border effects. Of course the real world sales
tax is far from the idealized model.32
The relative burden of the sales tax on consumers and producers has proven to be a difficult question to answer. Administrative
records are of no value in the sense that they
do not reveal who the buyer was (i.e., a business or an individual). Figure 9 shows the

Table 11 draws from the work of John
Mikesell, a preeminent scholar on indirect
taxes and the sales tax, and shows how the
sales tax treats selected business purchases.
Again, commonality within the region is the

Figure 9: Consumers’ and Producers’ Share of Sales Tax Burden,
New England States
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Source: “Consumers’ and Producers’ Share of the General Sales Tax,” by Raymond J. Ring, Jr.,
National Tax Journal 52 (1999): 79-90.
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For a discussion of changing the current sales tax to the ideal form, see “Moving the Retail Sales Tax to a Retail Tax: Optimal Tax
Considerations,” by Matthew N. Murray, The Sales Tax in the 21st Century, Praeger, 1997. A primary conclusion of this work is that given
competing policy objectives, it may prove difficult if not impossible to fully restructure the state sales tax away from its current form.
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norm, likely due to regional policy awareness and regional competition for business.
No state in the region provides broad exemptions for purchases of electricity and natural
gas; only a handful of states across the country provide such relief. Mikesell argues
strongly for broader exemptions for business
to reduce distortions, respond to international competitiveness33 and facilitate administration and compliance.

Table 12 shows a comparison of the sales tax
base for Maine and other states in the region,
drawing on a popular list of base components. (Detailed footnotes that appear in the
original source have been suppressed in this
table.) In general, Maine’s sales tax base is
largely consistent with that of its peers in
New England, and most discrepancies
involve items of relatively modest value.
Maine is the only state in the region not to
provide any form of relief on the purchase of

Table 11: State Sales Tax Provisions for Full and General Exemption
of Categories of Business Purchases
New England States

ME

CT

MA

Resale

X

X

Materials - ingredients

X

Materials - processing

X

Materials - research

*

X

NH

RI

VT

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

*

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Electric
Gas
Water
Telecom service - intrastate
Telecom service - interstate

X

Internet access

X

Software custom

X

Mfg. equip. & machinery

X

X

Pollution control - air

X

X

X

Pollution control - water

X

X

X

Notes:
*Connecticut: exempt after July 1, 2002.
*Maine: exemption for supplies used in biotechnicology applications.
Source: “Why Are States So Stingy with Sales Tax Production Exemptions?” by John L. Mikesell, State Tax
Notes, July 30, 2001.

33

Under the European VAT, input taxes are generally removed for goods subject to export. In the United States, however, sales tax liabilities
will be embedded in product price, making American-produced goods less competitive in the global arena.
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Table 12: Tax Status of Selected Components of the Sales Tax Base
New England States

Component

ME

CT

MA

NH

RI

VT

Clothing
Grocery food
Meals
Caterers
Nonpres. med
Med. services
Med. devices
Newspapers
Periodicals
Occasional sales
MVs, vessels, air
All other
Trade-ins
Food vending sales
Other vending sales
General services
Cleaning
Transportation
Repair
Professional/personal services
Vehicle leases
Tangible personal property lease
Rooms, lodgings
Canned soft
Custom soft
Modified canned
Computer hardware
Downloaded software
Mgf. and mach.
Utilities
Farm mach.
Air pollution control equipment
Water pollution control equipment
Sales for resale
Vendor comp

T
E
T
T
T
E
E
E
E

$75.0 E
E
T
T
E
E
E
E
T

$175.0 E
E
T
T
T
E
E
E
E

E
E
T
T
E
E
E
E
E

$110.0 E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
T

T
E
excluded
E
T
MT
E
E
E
E
T
T
T
T
E
E
T
E
E
T
E
E
E
MTC
none

T
E
E
E
T
M
T
E
T
T1
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
E
E
E
E
E
MTC
none

T
E
E
T
T
NT
E
E
E
E
T
T
T
T
E
E
T
E
E
E
E
T
T
no
none

-

T
E
E
T
T
NT
E
E
E
E
T
T
T
T
E
T
T
E
E
E
E
E
E
MTC
none

T
E
excluded
T
T
NT
E
T
E
E
E
T
E
T
E
E
T
E
E
E
E
T
T
MTC
*

Notes:
Special taxes may apply in specific instances.
E = exempt
T = taxable
MTC indicates use of Uniform Multijurisdictional Exemption Certificate.
MT = many taxed
NT = not taxed
1 Most professional services exempt.
* Can keep revenue collected under bracket system that is less than tax due.
Source: CCH, Inc., 2001.
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clothing. The schemes in place in
Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont
are difficult to administer and lend themselves to abuse, so Maine should not move in
their direction. For example, it is relatively
easy to split up one’s purchase of clothing
into two separate transactions to enjoy tax
relief. The clothing exemption, predicated
on offering relief to low income taxpayers,
provides relief to all taxpayers regardless of
ability to pay and of place of residence. Most
business services are exempt from sales tax.
Commerce Clearinghouse, Inc. (CCH, Inc.)
identifies Maine as a state that taxes many
general services relative to other states. As
most states broadly exempt services, this
does not mean that Maine has necessarily

cast a very broad tax net when it comes to
services taxation.
More information on the tax status of services is offered in Table 13. These data seem to
be in conflict with the data above showing
relatively modest taxation of services in
Maine. One reason is the data are not directly comparable. The data in Table 12 are confined to the general sales tax; the data in
Table 13 include the general sales tax as well
as levies on specific services (e.g., utilities
in New Hampshire are taxed under a specific utilities tax).
Not included for consideration in Table 13
are services generally untaxed across the

Table 13: Number of Services Taxed by Category and State
New England States

ME
Number
of
Services

Utilities

CT

%

Number
of
Services

9

56.3

Personal
services

1

Business
services

MA

%

Number
of
Services

10

62.5

5.0

11

6

17.6

Computer
services

3

Admis./amus.

NH

%

Number
of
Services

9

56.3

55.0

1

20

58.8

50.0

6

2

14.3

Professional
services

0

Fabrication, repair
& installation
Other services
Total
Percent of potential
service categories

RI

%

Number
of
Services

8

50.0

5.0

1

4

11.8

100.0

0

13

92.9

0.0

0

4

21.1

2
27

VT

%

Number
of
Services

%

Potential
Service
Categories

10

62.5

3

18.8

16

5.0

1

5.0

2

10.0

20

0

0.0

6

17.6

4

11.8

34

0.0

0

0.0

3

50.0

1

16.7

6

1

7.1

0

0.0

3

21.4

10

71.4

14

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

8

14

73.7

2

10.5

0

0.0

3

15.8

2

10.5

19

4.3

13

27.7

3

6.4

2

4.3

2

4.3

1

2.1

47

16.5

87

53.0

20

12.2

11

6.7

28

17.1

23

14.0

164

16.5

53.0

12.2

6.7

17.1

14.0

Note: Percent is the share of potential services actually taxed in a state.
Source: “Sales Taxation of Services: 1996 Update,” published by Federation of Tax Administrators, April 1997.
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states, such as most education and health
care services. The activities under the personal services category typically are consumed almost exclusively by individuals and
households (e.g., health clubs, cleaning, personal instruction, hair dressers), and therefore represent good general candidates for
sales-tax-base expansion. On the other hand,
the services in the business, professional,
and other categories are consumed by people and firms. For example, business services such as advertising, marketing, lobbying,
and secretarial services are consumed
almost exclusively by businesses, but interior design, photo finishing, photocopying and
security services are potentially acquired by
individuals or firms. Similarly, professional
services such as accounting, attorney and
engineering services are purchased by
households and businesses alike, but services like dentistry are purchased almost exclusively by people. Other services capture a
wide array of largely untaxed services ranging from construction to transportation to
automotive services; many of these also may
be used by firms or individuals. It is clear

that the broad taxation of services would add
considerably to business tax burdens absent
rate reductions and/or exemptions for business entities. However, it is also clear that
Maine does not make extensive use of specific excise taxes. In few instances does Maine
tax a significant share of the potential number of services (shown in the right-hand column of the table), and in few instances does
Maine lead the region. The highest share of
any category taxed falls under the utilities
heading, with all states (but New
Hampshire) taxing more than one-half of the
potential categories. Of the eight professional services considered by the FTA survey, no
state in the region taxes any of them.
The above discussion indicates that
Maine’s sales tax structure is largely consistent with the structure that prevails in
other New England states and states across
the nation. Nonetheless, several important
tax policy issues related to the sales tax can
be identified, and each can be linked back
to the requirements of a good tax system
discussed above.

Table 14: Sales Tax and Electronic Commerce
2001

2006

Revenue
Loss

Percent of
Total
State Taxes

Revenue
Loss

ME

57.80

2.01

150.60

CT

248.10

2.26

MA

256.00

1.60

NH

-

-

2011

Percentage Point
Rate Increase to
Replace Revenue

4.17

658.80
687.20
-

Percent
of Total
State Taxes

Revenue
Loss

Percent
of Total
State Taxes

Percentage Point
Rate Increase to
Replace Revenue

0.99

221.60

4.88

1.20

4.79

1.19

974.20

5.61

1.44

3.42

0.97

1,015.90

4.01

1.18

-

-

-

-

-

RI

48.90

2.28

126.50

4.75

1.40

184.80

5.53

1.69

VT

27.50

1.75

73.20

3.70

0.98

108.60

4.34

1.19

Note: Dollar amount in millions.
Source: “State and Local Sales Tax Revenue Losses from E-Commerce: Updated Estimates,” by Donald Bruce and William
F. Fox, Center for Business and Economic Research, The University of Tennessee, September 2001.
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First is the yield and elasticity of the sales
tax. It is likely that base expansion and/or
rate increases will be needed in the years to
come to meet general revenue needs and to
overcome erosion of the base due to economic factors. The state recently made the
decision to lower the sales tax rate, reducing both yield and elasticity. The policy
decision was made after a prolonged period
of decent economic and revenue growth,
perhaps not the best time to make such a
choice. There are important external forces
at play that will likely further compromise
yield and elasticity, including interstate
competition for business and remote sales.
Table 14 shows some of the projected consequences of electronic commerce for Maine
and other regional states to illustrate the
magnitude of the problem. Estimates suggest Maine lost $57.8 million in sales tax
revenue in 2001, or 2.01% of total state
taxes. By 2006 the revenue loss is expected
to grow to $150.6 million (4.17% of state tax
revenue) and by 2011 the loss will total
$221.6 million (4.88% of state taxes). Maine
will need to increase its sales tax rate by 1.2
percentage points in 2011 simply to maintain revenue yield.
Maine has chosen to participate in the
streamlined sales tax project, a joint effort of
the states to simplify sales tax laws, filing
procedures and tax administration. 34
Governor King signed legislation adopting

simplification on March 1, 2002. The practical outcome of this initiative would be uniform definitions of the tax base across states
for remote vendors. This would have implications for the tax
base in the state of
The state recently
Maine and would
made the decision to
likely entail some
lower the sales tax
loss in revenue. At
rate, reducing both
the same time it may
allow for broader taxyield and elasticity.
ation of remote vendors, increasing yield.
It is essential that the state stay actively
engaged in the streamlining process.
The alternative to rate increase is base
expansion should additional sales tax revenue be needed. Generally, rate increases
are less costly to administer and comply
with than an expansion in the base.
However, services represent a natural target
as they are largely untaxed in Maine and
other states, and base expansion to include
services has long been advocated.35 The
service sector is a growing element of the
economy, while traditional manufacturing
is a declining share of economic activity.
However, there are two major problems
with a policy change that would broadly tax
services. The first is political. A substantial
expansion of the base will encounter concentrated political opposition, along the
lines of the situation in Florida in the late
1980s. Florida expanded the base to general-

34

An overview of this effort can be found at www.geocities.com/streamlined2000. For background on the sales tax and electronic commerce,
see “The Sales Tax and Electronic Commerce: So What’s New?” by William F. Fox and Mathew N. Murray, National Tax Journal 50 (1997):
573-92; “Telecommunications Services and Electronic Commerce: Will Technology Break the Back of the Sales Tax?” by Matthew N.
Murray, State Tax Notes, January 12, 1997; “Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Taxing Internet Commerce,” by Austan Goolsbee and
Jonathan Zittrain, National Tax Journal 52 (1999): 413-28; and “Achieving a Level Playing Field for Electronic Commerce,” by Charles
McLure, State Tax Notes, January 14, 1998. The National Tax Association has been actively involved in policy analysis related to taxation of
electronic commerce; see “The National Tax Association’s Project on Electronic Commerce and Telecommunication Taxes,” by Kendall L.
Houghton and Gary C. Cornia, National Tax Journal 53 (2000): 1351-71.

35

For example, see “Economic Aspects of Taxing Services,” by William F. Fox and Matthew N. Murray, National Tax Journal 41 (1988): 10-36.
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ly include services, but the policy was
quickly rescinded due to political opposition. This suggests a more politically acceptable approach would be incremental versus
sweeping base expansion. Of course incremental expansion can produce little revenue at a point in time and may raise taxpayer uncertainty over future tax liabilities.
The second problem relates to the very
nature of services that might be brought into
the base. Some will meet objections due to
ethical concerns, especially in the context of
education and health services. (In this context, should Maine encounter a compelling
need for revenue, it may be preferable to
impose a low-rate gross receipts tax on sectors like health services, rather than the 5%
regular sales tax rate.) Many other services
are consumed heavily by the business sector—as is shown in Table 13—so that base
expansion would represent a substantial
increase in business costs. Any burden on
businesses could be reduced through broadened access to exemptions as the sales tax
base itself was broadened or, potentially, by
a lower sales tax rate.
One attractive component to add to the sales
tax base would be construction services.
Individuals and households would pay sales
tax on the value of construction materials
and the value of construction services, while
businesses would be provided an exemption.
Some might object to this policy, but it would
move Maine to the frontier of state sales tax
policy. Base expansion to include services
could be done on a revenue neutral basis as
well, producing an increase in the sales and
hence overall tax structure elasticity. At a
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minimum, Maine should proceed along the
lines of other states and incrementally add
services to the base, moving closer to a true
consumption tax. Generally, if the sales tax
base is expanded to include services, efforts
should be made to relieve the sales tax burden on the purchased inputs of service
providers to avoid pyramiding of tax.
Another important sales tax issue is the way
in which Maine uses the sales tax to address
equity concerns. As argued above, the best
means of dealing with equity on an ability to
pay basis is through the income tax. (A sales
tax will typically lead to horizontal
inequities due to different consumption of
taxable versus nontaxable items by different
households.) The current practice of
exempting grocery food and defining taxable
foods and eateries, while well intentioned,
has many problems. It is exceedingly difficult to administer and comply with this
structure;36 it raises the revenue costs of
low-income tax relief substantially by benefiting all taxpayers, including higher-income
taxpayers; it limits the state’s ability to
export the sales tax burden to visitors who
buy grocery food; and it reduces the stability of the sales tax and overall tax structure.
Despite these costs, more than twenty-five
other states around the country follow a
similar practice.37
Maine could choose to fully tax grocery
food and provide tax relief to low-income
households through a targeted and refundable credit under the income tax, as is done
in a half dozen states. Estimates of the sales
tax burden by level of income and by fami-

36

See “Sales and Use Tax Reference Guide,” www.state.me.us/revenue/salesuse/reference-03.htm. The complications inherent in Maine’s
sales tax structure are apparent from reviewing this document, as well as various information bulletins released by the state.

37

Another example of using the sales tax to achieve equity objectives is the infamous sales tax holiday, increasingly popular across the states.
An excellent discussion of the problems associated with sales tax holidays is provided in “Six Reasons to Hate Your Sales Tax Holiday,”
by Richard R. Hawkins and John L. Mikesell, State Tax Notes, March 5, 2001: 801-03.
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ly size could be developed and formalized
into the income tax filing structure. There
are criticisms of credit and rebate programs,
but these largely reflect choices made
by policymakers (e.g., offering insufficient
credits) rather than inherent defects of a
credit program.38
A final sales-tax policy issue is the taxation of
business inputs. The sales tax is the largest
business tax in the state. The goals of neutrality and economic development call for
lower taxes on business input purchases. But
Maine does not have the revenue flexibility
to fully relieve the sales tax burden on business. It will be increasingly important in the
years to come to offer general and targeted
exemptions as the Maine economy moves
further into the competitive global economy.
The focus should fall initially on footloose
businesses that are producing goods or services for export from the state, where the
extent of interstate and international competition is likely the greatest. Exemptions need
to be considered and justified in the broader
context of state revenue goals, including revenue yield and elasticity.

Local Tax Issues
The primary thrust of this report is state tax
policy and economic development. The role
of the local property tax in Maine government finances, if it can even be called a local
property tax today, is too important to sidestep. Maine confronts its own unique challenges to local government finance, reflect-

ing the current web of the local property tax,
limited alternatives to the property tax,
TIFS, BETR and service centers. But local
governments in Maine also confront more
general challenges being faced by communities around the country.39 This section of
the report briefly explores issues related to
the property tax in Maine, as well as localoption sales taxes.

Property Tax. The property tax in Maine is
the near-exclusive source of own-source revenue for municipalities, accounting for about
90% of collections. Local governments in
Maine have very little
fiscal autonomy and
The linkage between
very little fiscal flexibility. In many com- property taxes paid and
benefits received has
munities there is no
room to raise properbeen stretched to the
ty tax rates further,
breaking point in many
and there are no states, including Maine.
other viable local taxing instruments available to city (or county) governments today.
Even the local vehicle tax rate is fixed by the
state. The role of the property tax is complicated by a variety of forces, including local
tax-increment finance (TIF) programs, the
state-operated BETR program, the presence
of both circuit breakers and homestead
exemptions, state intergovernmental aid
(particularly education aid) and the local
service-center problem. It is no surprise then
that Maine has encountered increasingly
fierce opposition to the property tax and that
solving the problem, however defined, has
been exceedingly difficult.

38

See “Should States Tax Food? Examining the Policy Issues and Options,” by Nicholas Johnson and Iris J. Lav, State Tax Notes, June 1,
1998: 1785-807.

39

See “Metropolitan Taxation in the 21st Century,” by David Brunori, National Tax Journal 51 (1998): 541-51. The mobility of capital and labor
will make it increasingly difficult to fund local services. Brunori argues forcefully that land value taxation is one potential solution, where land
is taxed but improvements are not taxed, or taxed at reduced rates. The practice is rare in the United States, but it has been done.
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The property tax has long been viewed as the
primary taxing instrument and benefit tax at
the local level. That is, people and businesses
move to a community knowing the property
tax rate they will pay and the benefits they
will receive from their local government. The
linkage between property taxes paid and benefits received has been stretched to the breaking point in many states, including Maine.
Education finance has been increasingly
assumed at the state
level to ensure a reaMaine needs to fix
sonable degree of
its property tax, but
equity and wealth
in so doing must also
neutrality. The tax has
address state governbecome overly compliment revenue probcated as policymakers
have asked more and
lems, the financing
more of the tax to
of incentives, and
achieve both equity
the structure of aid
and economic develto local governments.
opment objectives.
The property tax has never been high on the
popularity list of taxes paid by households
and businesses. A primary reason is that tax
falls on stocks of property, which may have
little bearing on the current-year flow of
income. At the same time, property values
do closely align with long-term or lifetime
income, so in practice property tax relief
mechanisms address taxpayer liquidity constraints. Maine’s property tax also falls on
the personal property of business adding
substantially to their local tax burden. Table
15 shows property tax rates for the largest
city in each state for 2000. Portland’s burden
is tenth highest in the nation, and it is small
comfort that Bridgeport, Providence and
Manchester have higher rates. The rate in
Portland is 58% higher than the median rate.

56

Aggravating the problem within Maine are
wide disparities in municipal mill rates, as
shown in Table 16. Table 16 shows the highest and lowest rates within counties, and the
simple average within counties, for 1999.
The highest average of 20.08 prevails in
Androscoggin County, while the lowest average of 13.10 prevails in Hancock County. All
counties have at least one high-tax municipality. The highest rate of 47.0 applies to
Pownal in Cumberland County. The lowest
of the lows is 2.32 in Garfield Plantation.
The rate disparities create in-state inequities
and distort the locational choices of businesses and households alike. But there are
other property tax pressures as well. In
many instances, property tax burdens have
grown at a faster pace than the burden of
other taxes; there is a shrinking school-age
population; state-aid for education is supplanting the role of local taxes; and the relative burden on households versus commercial and industrial enterprises is growing.
Moreover, in Maine the property tax falls on
the personal property of businesses, sharply
increasing their tax liabilities and giving rise
to pressures for the BETR program. Maine
residents may think the trends and problems
are unique to their state. The fact is that
many of the same problems exist in other
places across the country.40
Rate disparities and high property tax rates
in Maine have lead to the implementation of
circuit breakers and homestead exemptions
to provide household relief, and the BETR
and TIFs programs to provide business
relief. There are many ways to provide such
relief in practice and there is controversy
over the justification for tax relief for both
businesses and households.41 Maine needs

40

For example, see “Pennsylvania’s Local Property Tax,” by Robert P. Strauss, State Tax Notes, June 4, 2001.

41

A nice discussion of alternative property tax relief mechanisms for households is provided in chapter 13 of Ronald C. Fisher’s State and Local
Public Finance, 2nd edition, Irwin, Chicago, 1996.
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Table 15: Residential Property Tax Rates in the Largest City in Each State, 2000
Rank

City

State

Nominal
Rate 1/
Per $100

Assessment
Level 2/

Effective
Rate
Per $100

Rank

City

State

Nominal
Rate 1/
Per $100

Effective
Assessment Rate
Level 2/
Per $100

1

Bridgeport

CT

6.50

70.0%

4.55

26 Columbia

SC

37.93

4.0%

1.52

2

Providence

RI

3.49

100.7%

3.52

27 Kansas City

MO

7.88

19.0%

1.50

3

Newark

NJ

24.88

13.4%

3.34

28 Portland

OR

2.07

72.1%

1.50

4

Manchester

NH

3.05

100.0%

3.05

29 Salt Lake City

UT

1.45

99.0%

1.43

5

Milwaukee

WI

2.98

101.1%

3.01

30 Boston

MA

1.32

100.0%

1.32

6

Philadelphia

PA

8.26

32.0%

2.64

31 Louisville

KY

1.30

100.0%

1.30

7

Houston

TX

2.59

100.0%

2.59

32 Wilmington

DE

2.30

56.3%

1.29

8

Des Moines

IA

4.36

56.3%

2.45

33 Wichita

KS

11.04

11.5%

1.27

9

Baltimore

MD

6.03

40.0%

2.41

34 Little Rock

AR

6.30

20.0%

1.26

10 Portland

ME

2.40

100.0%

2.40

35 Minneapolis

MN

1.45

85.9%

1.25

11 Fargo

ND

49.38

4.2%

2.07

36 Oklahoma City

OK

10.53

11.0%

1.16

12 Burlington

VT

2.20

93.7%

2.06

37 Albuquerque

NM

3.46

33.3%

1.15

13 Jacksonville

FL

2.03

38 Charlotte

NC

1.20

94.3%

1.13

14 Indianapolis

IN

12.67

15.0%

1.90

39 Virginia Beach

VA

1.22

92.0%

1.12

15 Atlanta

GA

6.68

40.0%

1.87

40 Seattle

WA

1.27

88.3%

1.12

16 Detroit

MI

5.94

30.4%

1.81

41 Los Angeles

CA

1.07

100.0%

1.07

17 Omaha

NE

1.88

95.0%

1.79

42 Las Vegas

NV

3.03

35.0%

1.06

18 Boise

ID

1.82

97.4%

1.77

43 Phoenix

AZ

10.00

10.0%

1.00

19 New Orleans

LA

17.00

10.0%

1.70

44 Washington

DC

0.96

100.0%

0.96

20 Anchorage

AK

1.77

94.5%

1.67

45 Chicago

IL

9.31

10.0%

0.93

21 Columbus

OH

5.15

31.9%

1.64

46 Charleston

WV

1.52

60.0%

0.91

22 Jackson

MS

16.39

10.0%

1.64

47 New York City

NY

10.88

7.3%

0.80

23 Memphis

TN

6.91

23.1%

1.60

48 Denver

CO

7.27

9.7%

0.71

24 Sioux Falls

SD

1.58

100.0%

1.58

49 Cheyenne

WY

7.45

9.5%

0.71

25 Billings

MT

2.12

72.5%

1.54

50 Birmingham

AL

6.95

10.0%

0.70

51 Honolulu

HI

0.37

100.0%

0.37

100.0% 203.00

Unweighted
average
Median

6.78

56.3% $1.67
$1.52

Note: All rates and percentages in this table are rounded.
1/ Source: City Assessor.
2/ Source: City Assessor or State Board of Equalization
Source: “Tax Rates and Tax Burdens in the District of Columbia—A Nationwide Comparison,” published by Government
of the District of Columbia, August 2001.
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to fix its property tax, but in so doing must
also address state government revenue
problems, the financing of incentives, and
the structure of aid to local governments.
These problems cannot be solved in isolation. The best approach would be to wipe
the slate clean, eliminate all special provisions and start from scratch. Currently rates
are perceived as too high. So business relief
is then offered, and offered essentially as an
entitlement to all businesses, regardless of
sector, capital investment, job creation, and
so on. All households receive the state-supported homestead exemption to alleviate
part of the property tax burden, while local
circuit breakers also are available for some
households. Why not simply lower the rate
and adjust the role played by intergovernmental aid? Incentive programs should be
incentive programs, not entitlements.

Equity can be better addressed through the
income tax and targeted to Maine residents.
Local government tax capacity needs legislated expansion. That is, there needs to be
broader portfolio of local taxing instruments
that can allow the spreading of tax burdens
across tax categories and different types of
economic activity. These changes are likely
too ambitious to achieve through incremental, piecemeal reform.

Local Sales Taxes. State and local governments across the country are looking for
ways to stabilize government finances in the
face of competitive pressures and changes in
the structure of the economy. The role of the
property tax has declined over time and is
not likely to recover any time soon. So there
is the compelling need to look to new and
alternative revenue sources. Maine likely

Table 16: Municipal Mill Rates, 1999
County

Highest Municipality

Lowest Municipality

14.04 Turner

Androscoggin

27.65 Lewiston

Aroostook

33.25 Grand Isle

Cumberland

47.00 Pownal

Franklin

21.20 Wilton

4.85 Rangeley Plt.

14.53

Hancock

19.90 Mariaville

5.30 Cranberry Isles

13.10

Kennebec

24.65 Waterville

Knox

24.30 Rockland

8.19 Matinicus Isle

14.43

Lincoln

21.30 Alna

5.80 South Bristol

13.02

Oxford

24.50 Mexico

3.20 Lincoln Plt.

14.93

Penobscot

25.70 Woodville

4.10 Lakeville

16.42

Piscataquis

22.95 Milo

2.86 Lake View Plt.

13.74

Sagadahoc

21.00 Bath

Somerset

26.15 Anson

5.50 Dennistown Plt.

14.72

Waldo

25.00 Winterport

9.60 Isleboro

17.03

Washington

26.00 Eastport

5.40 Beddington

16.30

York

24.35 Berwick

2.32 Garfield Plt.
10.30 Harpswell

10.60 Rome

11.14 Arrowsic

10.50 Wells

Source: www.memun.org/resources/Pub_tax/Full_Value/1999/fullpage1.html.
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20.08
17.22
19.45

17.56

15.94

16.02

has the capacity to increase the use of specific taxes and user fees at both the state and
local level. Resistance to such initiatives
from groups concerned with tax fairness will
be pronounced, but in practice local governments need a broader revenue portfolio.
At the local level, consideration of expanded
taxing authority needs to be accompanied by
a careful assessment of alternatives in terms
of the requirements of a good tax system discussed above. There are several other factors
that should be considered regarding local tax
levies.42 First and most generally is the
important local role of accountability and
flexibility in meeting local service delivery
needs of residents. The current wave of fiscal decentralization taking place across the
globe recognizes the importance of putting
both financing and service delivery at the
local level, where the consumers of government services can more easily evaluate quality and efficiency. As it currently stands
Maine’s system of local government finance
is effectively centralized at the state level.
There simply is no local autonomy.
Second, since it is the state that would
enable local government taxing authority,
including a local option sales tax, consideration must be given to how this may constrain
future tax policy choices of the state. A local
option sales tax of any magnitude would
make it somewhat more difficult for the state
to raise the state sales tax rate.
A third consideration is balance, which is
sorely missing in municipal government
finance in Maine. A more balanced tax system—one that relies on an array of tax
instruments—enables lower rates and

42

reduces perceived inequities and distortions.
Currently there is little revenue balance
since there are no viable alternatives to the
property tax.
Fourth are the fiscal disparities across communities that can result depending on how
local taxes are structured. The existence of
sharp fiscal disparities under the property
tax is one reason Maine and other states
have increasingly assumed the burden of
education finance. In
Maine the problem is
Other benefits of tax
on both sides of the
base sharing include
budget. That is, many
communities
have
reduced incentives for
insufficient revenue
sprawl and less fiscalcapacity, while other
ization of land use.
communities suffer
from onerous service
delivery requirements. In most instances,
the revenue potential of new taxing instruments will be highly correlated with the
yield of the existing local property tax.
However, this is not always the case. For
example, simple pairwise correlations of taxable sales and total plus real personal property by city in Maine yields a correlation
coefficient of only .59, although there is
wide disparity around this figure. The fact is
that a local options sales tax, gross receipts
tax or any other tax will benefit some communities substantially and offer little to
other communities. The Maine Service
Centers Coalition has proposed a restricted
variant of a local option sales tax that would
enable local option rates of up to one cent,
with proceeds earmarked for infrastructure
and one-time projects. Perhaps restrictions
are in order given the current structure of
state and local finances in Maine, but the

See Critical Issues in State-local Fiscal Policy: A Guide to Local Taxes, published by the National Conference of State Legislatures,
Washington, November 1997. More specific information can be found in Local Revenue Diversification: Local Sales Tax, published by the
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, September 1989.

Overview and Analysis of Major State Taxes

59

proposed initiative does little to solve the
range of financing problems confronted by
all local governments in Maine. The bill
never made it out of the legislature’s Joint
Tax Committee.
There are two broad perspectives on local
revenue need that help put the fiscal disparity problem in context. The first reflects relatively low local government tax capacity
and calls for some form of redistribution
from higher capacity districts. This is the traditional Robin Hood approach of many state
aid programs to local governments. The second reflects an imbalance between local
capacity and local service needs, where
many of the consumers of local government
services reside outside the taxing jurisdiction. In this instance a different policy remedy is needed. Charles Colgan of the
University of Southern Maine is among
those who have argued for some form of tax
base sharing should a local option sales tax
be implemented. In spirit the jurisdictions
comprising consumers of a municipal government’s services would be identified, the
base of the shared tax would be expanded to
include these same jurisdictions, and some
share of the revenue proceeds would accrue
to the municipality confronted with the burden of service provision. Other benefits of
tax base sharing include reduced incentives
for sprawl and less fiscalization of land use.
It would be important for any tax base sharing system to offer local governments some
degree of autonomy and flexibility. Tax base
sharing is a much discussed and debated
subject in local public finance, but few practical models have actually been put in place.
One example is around the Twin Cities area
of Minnesota. This program has been in
place since 1971 and allocates a share of the
43
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growth in sales tax revenue to support tax
base sharing across the region.43
A final consideration is deductibility under
the federal personal income tax. Income and
property taxes remain deductible, while the
sales tax is no longer deductible. This helps
to tip the balance away from a local option
sales tax, but given Maine’s high property tax
rates and high income tax burdens, there is
little flexibility under the current structure
to raise property rates further or allow local
option income taxes.

Other Alternatives. There are a limited
number of alternatives to local sales taxes.
Local income taxes are in place in a number
of states, but given the important role played
by the income tax at the state level, it is
impractical for Maine municipalities
because rates would simply be too high.
Payroll taxes, imposed on firms as opposed
to households are another option. But local
payroll taxes are extremely unpopular and
would encourage firms to locate to rural
areas with no tax. Local option corporate
income taxes exist in a small number of communities across the country, but given the
direction and complexity of the corporate
income tax, this is not a viable local alternative either. Other options include gross
receipts taxes, special excise taxes and user
fees. Consideration should be given to all
three of these latter alternatives, individually and as a group. A low-rate gross receipts
tax might be applied specifically to nonprofit entities, particularly benefiting the state’s
service centers; an alternative would be a
general low-rate gross receipts tax. New
Mexico provides a practical example, having
enabled effective July 1, 2002, a local hospital gross receipts tax in selected counties.

See “Regional Tax Base Sharing: The Twin Cities Experiences,” by Thomas Luce, Local Government Tax and Land Use Policies in the United
States, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1998.
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Legislation is subject to local voter approval
and carries a maximum rate of 0.5% on gross
receipts.44 Special excise taxes and user fees,
while perhaps insignificant on a tax-by-tax
basis, can together provide a significant
boost to local government tax coffers. A danger is that these taxes are put in place only in
service center communities, potentially
exacerbating the existing sprawl problem by
encouraging outmigration.
There are many compelling reasons to
expand local government taxing authority.
The current structure simply offers no local
government autonomy and flexibility, there
is no revenue balance and it has become
harder and harder to fund local services. But
new local taxes should not be enabled by the
state until it addresses fundamental tax
reform. The last thing Maine needs is another complicated levy layered on top of the
current state and local tax regime.

Summary
This lengthy section has provided a detailed
overview of major state taxes in Maine relative to other New England states and the
nation as a whole. Local tax issues have also
been addressed, focusing almost exclusively
on the existing local property tax. Several
important issues surface that warrant policy
consideration. As argued elsewhere, these
problems are often linked together and cannot be easily addressed in isolation.
The personal income tax has relatively high
rates and a quick pace of rate progression.
While the state buys considerable vertical
equity from this rate structure, substantial
burdens appear to fall on high-income taxpayers increasing the potential for serious
44

tax distortions. Revenue-neutral rate restructuring should be considered. The personal
income tax should be the primary if not
exclusive means of securing tax fairness
through the overall state tax system.
The state corporate income tax is in a declining mode nationwide. At the same time, corporate tax collections in Maine do
not appear to have The personal income tax
should be the primary
fallen commensurate with the nation
if not exclusive means
nor the region. As
of securing tax fairness
with the personal
through the overall
income tax, efforts
state tax system.
should be made to
flatten the current
progressive rate structure and align it with
the personal income tax. Consideration
should be given to implementation of a business enterprise tax, similar to that employed
in New Hampshire, as a replacement for the
corporate tax. The business tax burden
would be expanded to include all businesses,
while the base would be so large as to allow
low rates and a more stable flow of state tax
revenue. More information is needed on the
way in which the corporate income tax, as
well as other state taxes, effect businesses.
Finally, the use of incentives, whether as a
stand-alone policy or under the umbrella of
the corporate income tax, needs to be carefully evaluated in terms of both their costs
and benefits.
Sales tax policy should seek to generally protect the tax base and avoid rate reductions
that would compromise yield and elasticity.
Legitimate exemptions to businesses should
continue to be extended, as revenues permit. At the same time the base should be
expanded to include consumer services,

House Bill 290 of the New Mexico 2002 legislative session. Revenues are dedicated to support hospital capital costs.
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including construction services. The sales
tax should not be used to pursue equity
objectives, as is currently the case with the
special treatment of food.
Finally, something must be done about local
government finances. Currently, local governments have little if any autonomy in setting rates and generating revenues from own
sources, but expanded taxing authority is not
warranted until the web of local government
finance and state aid is addressed more fully,
including BETR and TIFs. Several options
exist for expanding local taxing authority,
including local option sales taxes, gross
receipts taxes, and specific taxes and fees.
Tax-base sharing or state aid may be needed
to help account for disparities between tax
capacity and service delivery needs.
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THIS

REPORT HAS COVERED A LOT
of ground, and much of that which has been
covered has not received the detailed attention that is truly warranted. Still, it is hoped
that the issues surveyed, data presented and
ideas offered will help prompt further discussion and dialogue regarding tax policy at
the state and local levels in Maine.

Tax Policy and Development
A major focus of the report has been tax policy and economic development. Taxes clearly influence development, just as development and growth patterns influence revenues. But economic development is just one
goal for state and local tax structure. Policies
to promote economic development must be
balanced against other tax policy objectives,
including tax fairness; revenue yield, stability and elasticity; and low costs of administration and compliance. Compromises will most
certainly be required in practice as the state’s
tax system is subject to reform and change in
the years to come. There is plenty of work to
do. The complexity and transparency of the
tax system needs improvement; greater balance in state and local tax portfolios is needed; tax rates need to be flattened and if
possible reduced to avoid distortions; sincere
and practical incentive programs must be
developed; and the service-center problem
requires a remedy.
To effectively use taxes to promote economic development, it is important to begin with

well-established and agreed upon goals.
General goals might include increasing average earnings, the rate of job creation and private capital investment. More specific goals
may be required in practice, and to the
extent possible they should be practical and
measurable. Specific strategies will then
need to be designed and implemented to
meet development goals. If taxes are to be
used, there should be a clear linkage
between specific tax policies and specific
development strategies.
Similarly, any potential tax gains from economic development policies should be identified. In Maine there have been numerous
discussions of tourism development and the
promotion of the state as a place for retirement to improve economic fortunes and
expand the tax base. Such policies need to be
critically evaluated in
terms of economic
To effectively use
gains and fiscal effects,
taxes to promote
including both the tax
and expenditure sides
economic developof the budget. Tourism
ment, it is important
appears
attractive
to begin with wellbecause of the abunestablished and
dant natural resources
agreed upon goals.
in Maine that can
attract visitors and
enable exporting of taxes to non-residents.
Visitors will help to create new jobs and
expand incomes for some in Maine, and will
help boost tax revenues as well. But tourism,
as with any development strategy, has its
limitations as well. For example, many jobs
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in tourism offer relatively low pay and seasonal employment. In addition, while exporting taxes sounds like a good idea, it may not
achieve the desired objective. That is, taxes
paid by tourists actually may be borne by
local landowners or local workers, if tourists
are sufficiently mobile in seeking out alternative travel destinations. In general, both the
strengths and weaknesses of different candidate development strategies must be identified to enable informed choice.
Attracting retirees entails a somewhat different cost-benefit calculus.45 Retirees are
viewed as especially attractive by communities with few other viable economic development opportunities in part because of potentially high levels of disposable income. As
this income is spent, jobs and earnings are
supported, as are state and local tax bases.
Retirees do consume government services,
although they do not use educational services. Still, many retirees also spend a considerable portion of their income on travel and in
places other than their primary place of residency. From a tax perspective, income may
be sheltered from the personal income tax
and spending may be disproportionately on
non-taxable services (i.e., health care), thus
offering little boost to the sales tax. Finally,
most retirees do not have full-time jobs. In
practice most households do not pay enough
taxes to finance the services they derive
from state and local government, requiring
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tax payments from businesses. Like tourism,
any specific strategy for economic development will have its strengths and weaknesses,
but these need to be drawn out to support
the policymaking process. This is true of call
centers, back offices, traditional manufacturing, and so on.
The current progressive corporate rate structure should be flattened, ideally to a single
rate. Similarly, the progressivity of the personal income tax should be reduced to avoid
distortions for entrepreneurship and the creation of high-quality jobs. Sales tax burdens
on business input purchases should be
reduced to the extent allowed by revenue
yield, while consumer services should be
brought into the base. Incentives—as opposed
to entitlements—need to be developed to
allow Maine to be competitive with other
states in New England and across the nation.
If incentives are to be used, they should be
designed with care and used with caution.
Generally, incentives will not be self-financing.46 That is, tax cuts to promote growth
seldom yield a large enough private sector
response to produce revenue gains that offset the costs of the incentive program. The
logic is simple: State and local government
budgets are in balance absent incentives, so
how can government sustain service delivery and keep budgets whole while giving
away part of the tax base? In general, incen-

45

For work specific to Maine, see “Taxes and Retirement in Maine,” by John D. Donahue and Herman B. Leonard, prepared for the Libra
Foundation, Harvard University, October 20, 1999. Also see “Economic and Fiscal Implications of Nonmetropolitan Retirement Migration,”
by Nina Glasgow and Richard Reeder, The Journal of Applied Gerontology 9 (1990): 423-51; “Migrating Retirees: A Source for Economic
Development,” by Mark Fagan and Charles F. Longino, Jr., Economic Development Quarterly 7 (1993): 98-106; “Economic Impact of
Retirement Migration,” by Steven Deller, Economic Development Quarterly 9 (1995) 25-38; and “The Elderly’s Income and Rural
Development: Some Cautions,” by Robert A. Hoppe, Rural Development Perspectives, February-May, 1991: 27-32.
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There is little, if any, careful analytical work on economic development incentives. An overview of both conceptual issues and practical
strategies is Economic Development Incentives and the Tennessee Valley Economy, by Matthew N. Murray, Center for Business and
Economic Research, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, June 1990. Also see Directory of Incentives for Business Investment and
Development in the United States: A State-by-State Guide, National Association of State Development Agencies, Urban Institute Press,
Washington, 1986. While now dated, it provides a nice descriptive overview of a wide range of incentives used by the states.

Tax Policy and Economic Development in Maine: A Survey of the Issues

tives should be used to create something that
would not be created without the incentive.
(Of course, proving that incentives work in
practice is impossible.) And they should be
targeted to companies that are creating highquality jobs (with above-average earnings)
and making above-average capital investment
(to
ensure
competitiveness).
Incentives should not be used when firms
will be competing with one another in the
state; generally, incentives should be used to
help firms that export goods or services from
the state. Finally, it should be recognized
that in certain parts of Maine there are relatively higher costs of doing business because
of factors like location and isolation. In these
instances an incentive premium might be
needed to overcome the extra hurdle associated with running a business in a relatively
isolated location. This is a common state
practice.

Other Tax Policy
Considerations
Tax fairness should be pursued primarily
through the state income tax as it can
specifically address differences in taxpayer
ability to pay. Generally, residents must reevaluate how much equity they can afford
to buy through the tax system. Both capital
and high-income workers have acquired
considerable sensitivity to high tax rates.
Since the pursuit of tax fairness requires
some degree of redistribution from higherincome and/or business taxpayers, such
policies are distortionary. Consideration
should be given to placing the sales tax on
food and providing refundable credits
through the income tax. This would reduce
administration and compliance costs,
improve revenue yield and stability, and
allow exporting of the tax to nonresidents.

Both state and local tax systems need greater
balance. At the state level there is excessive
reliance on the income tax, while at the local
level there is near exclusive reliance on the
property tax. Options at the state level
include incremental taxation of consumer
services, a low-rate gross receipts tax, a lowrate business enterprise tax like that in New
Hampshire, and greater reliance on specific
taxes and fees. At the
local level there Incentives—as opposed
needs to be more
to entitlements—need
local autonomy and
to be developed to
flexibility in generatallow Maine to be
ing own-source revcompetitive with other
enue. The current
state in New England
property tax can
and across the nation.
hardly be called a
local property tax
given tax relief mechanisms for households
and business, and the currently high rates.
Options include local option sales taxes,
gross receipts taxes, specific excise taxes and
user fees. Some form of tax base sharing or
state aid program will be required to address
the infamous service-center problem.
Greater balance reduces distortions and provides a more stable tax portfolio.
The elasticity of specific taxes and the overall
tax system needs to be carefully evaluated in
light of short-term and long-term financing
needs. Generally, some degree of elasticity
should be protected to allow for public investments and the replenishment of rainy day
funds following periods of weak economic
and revenue growth. Flattening of the personal income tax rate structure would reduce
elasticity. Elasticity could be enhanced
through a business enterprise tax or the sales
taxation of certain consumer services.
Finally, there needs to be a foundation of
models, data and research to support tax pol-
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icy reform. Many of the ingredients are
already in place. For example, the state has
the capacity to evaluate tax incidence and
equity, although it needs to fine-tune its
approach to the incidence of business taxes,
which is no easy task. Similarly, forecasting
is done by the Maine State Revenue
Forecasting Committee. Generally, analysis
needs to encompass all dimensions of the
requirements of a good tax structure. Unless
all the consequences of a policy change can
be identified, there is no assurance that the
policy choice will be the right one for Maine
and its residents. Perhaps most important is
the need for a catalyst that can motivate the
process of comprehensive tax reform.
Hopefully the catalyst is the hard work of
Maine residents who understand most of the
problems and the options at their disposal.
In practice, crisis often serves as a catalyst. It
is hoped that this is not the case in Maine.
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Appendix

Interviews and Contacts
Dana Connors, Maine State Chamber of Commerce
Christopher Hall, Maine State Chamber of Commerce
Todd Gabe, University of Maine
Kit St. John, Maine Center for Economic Policy
Josephine LaPlante, University of Southern Maine
Charles Colgan, University of Southern Maine
Geoff Herman, Maine Municipal Association
Peter Mills, Senator
Ralph Townsend, University of Maine
Laurie Lachance, State Planning Office
Michael Saxl, Representative and Speaker of the House
Joe Bruno, Representative and Republican Floor Leader
Paula Valente, Institute for a Strong Maine Economy
John Oliver, L.L. Bean
John Hart, National Semiconductor
Anne Gauthier, National Semiconductor
Steven Levesque, Department of Economic and Community Development
Alan Brigham, Department of Economic and Community Development
Fran Harrison, Fairchild Semiconductor
Matt Towse, Fairchild Semiconductor
Joel Pond, Fairchild Semiconductor
David Brennerman, UnumProvident
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